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19 June 1980

# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 22/80)



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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BEIRUT TRYING TO RESTORE PRE-CIVIL WAR FINANCIAL ACTIVITY

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 25 Apr, 1 May 80 pp 46-47

[Article: "Bahrain Prospers Financially; Beirut Tries to Regain Its Standing After Improvement of Its Security Conditions"]

[Text] The volume of money invested in Bahrain reached 27 billion dollars, while Beirut, awaiting improvement of its security conditions, is trying to regain its financial standing in tripartite transactions by offering higher guarantees.

The volume of deposits at the financial center in Bahrain is estimated at 27 billion dollars. In 1976, foreign banks were allowed to establish branches in Bahrain by means of special permits which prohibited them from conducting local commercial banking transactions.

By the end of last year, 51 Arab, joint Arab-foreign and foreign banks were operating under these rules. In addition, there were 27 offices representing banks, 20 fully licensed commercial banks and 6 investment firms.

Financial observers note that banking activities in Bahrain are mainly in cash transactions, short term loans to finance commercial transactions and bank guarantees required by contractual agreements.

However, loans to finance development projects remain relatively limited, especially as many of such loans entered on the books of banks in Bahrain are loans previously arranged outside the country by European banks that have branches in Bahrain.

Arab banking establishments state that the future of the financial market in Bahrain depends on financial decisions which are sometimes made outside the country and mainly in Saudi Arabia.

Bahrain may have been able to seal Beirut's financial show, mainly in the tripartite transactions, due to the Lebanese civil war and security conditions in Beirut. But we find two Lebanese banks which are very optimistic about the financial future of Beirut, especially after the recent rush of

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capital into the banking sector. This is apparent in the establishment of 12 new banks with a capital of 15 to 20 million pounds each, or a total capital of some 200 million pounds, bearing in mind that the volume of transactions of each bank is usually many times larger than its capital. In addition to that, a number of local banks have undergone significant changes of ownership and have been injected with additional Arab and foreign capital.

The number of operating banking establishments whose credit is accepted by the Lebanese Central Bank has reached 85. According to banking sources, this number is expected to reach 100. In this regard, financial authorities are insisting that new investments should consist of Arab or joint Arab-foreign capital.

#### Tripartite Transactions

The purpose of the Lebanese Central Bank is to improve Beirut's financial role in international tripartite transactions, or transactions servicing 2 outside parties. Lebanon was a pioneer in such operations prior to the civil war, to the extent that there were 160 offices in Lebanon representing American, European, Japanese and other foreign banks.

According to banking sources these banks still find Beirut to be a good and important center for their activities in the area, in spite of the fact that some of them have established branches in Cyprus, Greece and Bahrain during the Lebanese civil war. These banks will undoubtedly return to Beirut as security and political stability is reestablished.

Lebanese officials are very optimistic that Beirut will regain its distinguished role on the financial and banking levels. Due to such optimism, Lebanese officials are taking every measure to create the proper environment for the Lebanese capital to flourish again after the end of the civil war.

In addition to economic freedom, which was protected by laws and regulations from independence day until now, freedom of foreign exchange, banking secrecy, joint accounts and insurance of deposits, the Lebanese government took the following new measures to enhance this freedom and attract Arab and foreign capital:

- Establishment of a free banking zone, or what is known as the "off shore" system applied in Bahrain since 1976.

- Establishment of a government agency to guarantee the security of investments against war dangers including civil wars.

- Allowing the licensing of new banks.

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#### Other Measures and Guarantees

Some of the other measures which are being studied by the government are:

1. To modify the income tax law, especially as it relates to profits of corporations, in order to attract capital which can be invested in such corporations. Minister of Finance 'Ali al-Khalil said that the modified law will be put into effect very soon.
2. To exempt interest rates earned on deposits from the income tax. The tax amounts to ten percent currently, and generates an annual revenue of some eight million pounds. Shaykh Michel al-Khuri, president of the Lebanese Central Bank, drafted a bill which was submitted to the cabinet for the application of this exemption.
3. To develop the financial market as follows:  
  
To develop and diversify government bonds, so that they will no longer be confined to the banking sector, but will become available to the public.
4. To issue reconstruction bonds to finance the projects included in the plan of the council of development and reconstruction.
5. To allow large known corporations to issue marketable debentures.

All these matters were discussed by representatives of the Central Bank, the World Bank and the international monetary fund. The World Bank agreed to share in financing a new intermediary financing institution in Lebanon.

This institution, which is expected to be established in the near future, would be a step toward the establishment of more Lebanese as well as Arab and international intermediary financing institutions.

Does this mean that there is competition between Beirut and Bahrain?

Arab financial observers see Beirut's market as complementary to Bahrain's market. There is a very large volume of Arab financial surpluses and a variety of Arab investments. Each of the Beirut and Bahrain market gets more than its share of these resources. They are large enough, however, to create an urgent need for additional financial markets in other Arab countries.

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ALGERIA

FIGURES ON POWER FOR YEAR 1979 GIVEN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1029

[Unsigned article]

[Text] In a recently released announcement, the Algerian Ministry of Energy and Petrochemical Industries furnished some data on power for the year 1979. Salient among this data is the fact that crude oil remains preponderant in Algerian exportations and that oil revenues grew by 52.76 percent compared to 1978. Figures for 1979 amount to 9.3 billion dollars (36 billion dinars.)

Based on the ministry's announcement, EL MOUDJAHID gives the following figures on power in Algeria during 1979: total production of crude oil and condensate amounted to 56,898,248 metric tons, or a decrease of 0.52 percent compared to 1978. Crude oil production, amounting to 52,504,202 tons, decreased by 3.09 percent, while condensate production reached 4,394,036 tons for a growth of 45 percent compared to last year.

Algerian natural gas production continues its rapid growth with 21.4 billion m<sup>3</sup>, for an increase of 51.78 percent. This also true for LNG (liquefied natural gas) whose production level is undergoing a 78.39 percent increase compared to 1978, and for LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) whose growth rate is 4.04 percent.

For hydrocarbon derivatives, fuels show a drop of 17.20 percent, fertilizers a drop of 36.50 percent, bitumens an increase of 59.95 percent, and lubricants, an increase of 1.27 percent.

Crude oil exports for Sonatrach (National Algerian Hydrocarbon Company) amounted to 33,373,578 metric tons for 1979, while the exports of associates amounted to 11,695,229 tons for a total of 45,068,807 tons.

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Growth of condensate and LNG exports remains very steady for 1979. Condensate exports amounted to 3,944,282 metric tons for an increase of 75.52 percent; LNG exports were 19.61 million m<sup>3</sup>, which is an increase of 81.54 compared to 1978.

As for LPG exports, they added up to 317,736 tons (an increase of 2.80 percent); the figure for fuels was 2,916,594 tons (a 10.93 percent drop). In addition, 78,062 tons of petrochemical products (methanol and ethylene) were exported during 1979.

Crude oil and condensate deliveries on the domestic market registered a 1979 increase of 24.24 percent (5,623,782 metric tons); for natural gas, the increase was 31.31 percent (4,136 billion m<sup>3</sup>).

For 1979, currency from hydrocarbon exports amounted to more than 9.3 billion dollars (3.6 billion dinars) for an increase of 52.76% compared to 1978.

The breakdown by products is as follows: crude oil, 77.73 percent; condensate, 7.78 percent; refined products, 7.49 percent; LNG, 6.13 percent; LPG, 0.58 percent; petrochemicals, 0.27 percent.

Finally, national production of electricity amounted to 6,120 GWh in 1979 and national consumption saw an increase rate of 16.8 percent reaching a figure of 5,584 GWh.

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ALGERIA

DECISIONS OF FLN CENTRAL COMMITTEE GIVEN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 May 80 pp 1083-84

[Unattributed article: "Third Session of FLN Central Committee: Priority for Agriculture"]

[Text] Three important items are on the agenda of the FLN Central Committee (Algerian Unified Party) which opened its first session for 1980 on 3 May at the Palais des Nations (near Algiers), in a political atmosphere troubled by recent events in Greater Kabylia.

This central committee whose activities are presided by Mr Chadli Bendjedid, chief of state and general secretary of the FLN party, is examining several reports on problems in agriculture, tourism, and the application of the arabisation policy.

It should be re-stated that the FLN Central Committee is the seat where the country's fundamental economic and political decisions are reached.

The agricultural issue is the central topic of debate. The agricultural deficit has become one of the major preoccupations of the Algerian government. Production is increasingly failing to meet the population's food requirements; consumption is sharply increasing as a function of rapid demographic growth (3.2 percent per year) as well as a result of increased incomes.

The satisfaction of these food needs through national production -- which is slightly on the increase -- has fallen from 73 percent ten years ago to about 40 percent. Food importations, notably of grain products, represent a heavy burden (an average of 1.2 billion dollars per year) for the balance of payments, already seriously affected by a foreign debt estimated at about 16 billion dollars.

The limits placed on major landholding and the distribution of land which took place since the launching of the agrarian revolution in 1971 have not produced the expected results, while former colonial farms, placed under

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self-management in the wake of independence, are being hampered by a corresponding encroaching bureaucracy. According to official figures, 40 percent of the 6000 agricultural cooperatives in service for the past 8 years are in deficit, while due to rural exodus in particular, nearly half of the arable surface (7 to 8 million hectares) remains uncultivated.

The complexity of these problems and their political impact are such that no less than three reports with different recommendations on exploitation methods for collective lands have been submitted to the central committee. These suggestions range from pure and simple transformation of public land into state farms, to private management of these lands which would nevertheless remain state property, not to be parcelled or sold. An intermediate option provides for maintaining present structures while strengthening technical staffs, together with increased financial aid to small private farmers.

The second issue under discussion concerns tourism. It must be studied from the viewpoint of the effects of a policy of mass popular tourism, and the opening of this sector to increased participation on the part of private hotels and local communities for the better exploitation of locations heretofore neglected.

Another pressing issue since recent events at Tizi-Ouzou is the question of arabisation, which will probably be among the most fiercely debated. The spread of arabisation is upheld strongly by all Algerian media. However, its implementation will become more gradual and it appears that more careful consideration will be given to local, cultural and linguistic particularities.

The problem of state enterprise restructuring, which, according to EL MOUDJAHID, was to be broached at this session, is not included on the agenda. This is a technical problem, whose political implications are clear to the extent where the anticipated breakdown of most national companies, notably Sonatrach (oil), CNAN (maritime navigation), Sonitex (textiles), Sonacome (mechanical enterprises), Sonelec (electronics), and others, brings back the question of established powers and feudalities whose gigantism "makes their management increasingly complex." The postponement of this issue is all the more surprising since several projects seem to be awaiting decisions in this domain.

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EGYPT

POWER STRUGGLE AMONG SADAT'S CLOSE AIDES DISCLOSED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10 Apr 80 pp 18-23

[Article: "This is How Egypt is Ruled; Mansur Hasan Competes with Husni Mubarak; Jihan is the Only One who Says 'No' to the President"]

[Text] On the occasion of the dismissal of Hasan Kamil, Chief of the president's office in Egypt, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI presents the following reportage which was sent by one of its correspondents in Cairo about what is going on inside the narrow circle surrounding President al-Sadat.

On 24 March, the Egyptian papers came out with a report published in small letters on their frontpages. It said: "President Anwar al-Sadat has issued a decision to abolish the position of chief of the President's office which was held by Hasan Kamil. President al-Sadat has also issued a decision appointing Mahmud 'Abd al-Nasir as secretary general of the Presidency. Mr Mahmud 'Abd al-Nasir held the position of director of public relations at the Presidency."

The item might not draw the attention of the ordinary reader, but it is in fact of the utmost importance to those who follow Egyptian politics, for it signals a landmark in the struggle among the centers of power in Egypt, or at least it is one of the indicators of the perennial struggle within the closed circle surrounding President al-Sadat.

The abolished position, namely that of the chief of the President's office, is not an ordinary one. It parallels the position of chief of the royal cabinet which was held during the monarchical regime by a prominent political personality. This personality normally played the role of a major link between the king and the political leaders, parties and circles in the country. Thus, the abolition of this position and the dismissal of its occupant, Hasan Kamil (59), provide an opportunity for discussing the events that are taking place inside the circle surrounding al-Sadat, and the main actors and roles which those actors play in the struggle that goes on among them.

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Hasan Kamil is an old friend of President al-Sadat and a former ambassador. He became part of the tight circle surrounding al-Sadat when he was appointed his chief aide in April 1973. His ambition, however, went far beyond the role of a personal secretary or a "protocol" officer in the court of the Egyptian president. When Hasan Kamil later took over the position of the chief of the President's office, he sought to turn it into a political position. He received ambassadors and other personalities and ran in the elections for the People's Assembly last year from the district of Al-Azbakiyah. He won the elections and became chairman of the foreign relations committee in the assembly.

At the latest congress of the Socialist International, he represented the ruling National party in Egypt. He also led the Egyptian delegation which held talks with the leftist Israeli Mapam party. He heads the Egyptian-Greek Friendship Association. His chief ambition was to become foreign minister.

By virtue of his main position in the court of the president, Mr Kamil was a member of the tight circle which surrounds al-Sadat and was privy to al-Sadat's political and personal secrets as well as his private affairs about which the state knows nothing. He was no stranger to the implications of the huge trade and economic deals concluded by the state, by reason of his relationship with al-Sadat, on the one hand, and top businessmen, on the other. Prominent among these is the Greek multimillionaire (Latsis) who contributed money last year--for the love of God--for the construction of a religious institute in Alexandria.

Naturally, because of his position and his membership in the tight circle, Hasan Kamil was bound to be involved in the struggle going on within that circle. It is not necessarily a political struggle, since its ultimate aim is to be closer to President al-Sadat and win his approval. In that struggle, Hasan Kamil was considered to be Vice President Husni Mubarak's man. The Mubarak faction is pitted against the faction of Mansur Hasan, the minister of state in the President's office and the rising star in the political and official arena by virtue of his close relationship with al-Sadat.

How Hasan Kamil Fell

Circles within the presidential palace relate a story about the direct reason for the fall of Hasan Kamil. According to the story, Mansur Hasan discovered a big business deal which had been concluded in the naval field under the supervision and with the knowledge of Hasan Kamil. Commission in that deal ranged between \$12 and 15 million. It seems that Mansur Hasan knew how to disclose the deal to al-Sadat at a council which included members of the tight circle surrounding al-Sadat. He mentioned it in passing, almost casually, and al-Sadat interrupted him with an inquiry about it. Coolly, Mansur Hasan replied that engineer 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman must surely know about it and must know its details.

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Engineer 'Uthman is also a member of Sadat's tight circle. By virtue of his work in the field of contracts, economy and trade, al-Sadat assigned him to oversee all the major trade and economic deals and agreements concluded by the state, so that no agreement can be signed before he has examined it. When 'Uthman denied that he knew anything about the deal, Mansur Hasan said that Hasan Kamil has probably informed Husni Mubarak about it. So, with a clever scheme, the shrewd minister of state managed to drive a wedge between Hasan Kamil and 'Uthman and at the same time to deal an underhanded blow to Husni Mubarak since Hasan Kamil is his man. When Husni Mubarak denied any knowledge of the deal, al-Sadat flew into a rage. According to the circles of the presidential palace which related the story, President al-Sadat rebuked Hasan Kamil by telling him: "You're not only a thief, but a liar too." Al-Sadat added that familial traditions and village morals cannot allow "a thief and a liar" to remain in his present position. His dismissal of Hasan Kamil thus took place in this humiliating manner.

The story goes on to say that Hasan Kamil, sensing the damage done to Husni Mubarak's wing, seized the opportunity to follow with another blow. After the dismissal of Hasan Kamil, he told al-Sadat that the time is opportune to reorganize the affairs and office of the president. He suggested that Husni Mubarak take over all administrative and political responsibilities in the president's office. Sadat answered: "No, you'll assume those responsibilities."

The struggle will thus continue in earnest between Mansur Hasan, the minister of state, and Husni Mubarak, the vice president.

Mahmud 'Abd al-Nasir who has become secretary general of the presidency, is not related to the late president 'Abd al-Nasir. He was an ordinary employee in the Arab affairs bureau in the president's office. That office was held for a while by the late Kamal Rif'at. However, the picture cannot be complete unless we discussed the various stages of the struggle within al-Sadat's tight circle and presented the influential personalities which played and are still playing a major role in it.

In the first half of the 1970's, Ashraf Marwan (24), the husband of the late President 'Abd al-Nasir's youngest daughter, Muna, the most prominent member of the tight circle. He was the director of the president's office and well trusted by al-Sadat. Accordingly, it is said that al-Sadat chose him to be the liaison officer between Egyptian intelligence and American intelligence during the period when al-Sadat's regime began to change course and turn swiftly to the West. When the star of Husni Mubarak began to rise within the tight circle, a collision took place between him and Ashraf Marwan because of overlapping security, political and economic powers. There is no doubt that Ashraf Marwan was the smarter and stronger party in this struggle, but his quick fall is due to a basic reason, namely, his reservations about al-Sadat's initiative with Israel and the Camp David accords.

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Husni Mubarak Not a Dangerous Personality

Husni Mubarak thus achieved a quick and easy victory against his chief rival. Despite the "pomo" that attends his position as vice president, he is in fact nothing more than a director of one of the major offices attached to the presidency. Since he became vice president in April 1975, Mubarak has been a member of the tight circle. He is also a principal party in the struggle that goes on among its members, who are all either directors of other offices or personal and close friends of President al-Sadat. Al-Sadat chose him for that position when he decided to honor "the heroes of the October war generation. He was chosen from among a number of officers, most prominent of whom were Marshal Ahmad Isma'il 'Ali, [then] the minister of war, Lt Gen Muhammad 'Abd al-Ghani al-Gamasi, the chief of staff, Lt Gen Muhammad 'Ali Fahmi, the commander of air defense and naval Lt Gen Fu'ad Dhikri, commander of the navy. Husni Mubarak was commander of the air force. His colleagues describe him as an excellent and highly efficient officer.

Perhaps the reason for the selection of Husni Mubarak was that Marshal Ahmad Isma'il was sick at the time and was known to have cancer, while naval Lt Gen Dhikri was advancing in age. Al-Gamasi was chosen to succeed Lt Gen Isma'il, because he did not see for himself a role outside the armed forces. He was a regular officer with no political ambitions. The president did not feel comfortable about Lt Gen Muhammad 'Ali Fahmi. Fahmi had written a book about the role of electronics in modern warfare under the title of "The Fourth Force." In his book, he said that the credit of rebuilding the Egyptian armed forces goes to President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir.

One of the factors which encouraged al-Sadat to pick Husni Mubarak for the position of the vice president was the fact that he was never involved in politics in the past and in fact knew virtually nothing about it. Mubarak grew up in the countryside and, like al-Sadat, comes from the governorate of Al-Minufiyah. Like al-Sadat too, he is married to a lady whose mother is British. He received his high training in the Soviet Union. Husni Mubarak still boasts that he has graduated as a politician from "the university of Anwar al-Sadat." In other words, he represented no danger to the man at the top.

Engineer 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman (65) is also a member of the tight circle surrounding the decision-maker in Egypt. He entered the circle by virtue of his long-standing friendship with the president and the familial relationship between them. His son is married to one of the president's daughters.

'Uthman is the dean of engineers. He also oversees the "economic and commercial aspects" of the deals and contracts concluded by the state. He is not insulated from the implications of those deals. In addition, he fulfills the role of "the official in charge of food security." It



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is ironical that this position is virtually an honorary one at a time when Egypt faces the biggest food shortage in its history.

#### Mansur Hasan the Smartest

Mansur Hasan, the rapidly rising star in the tight circle, is a minister of state in the presidency in addition to being in charge of information in Egypt. Furthermore, he is presently al-Sadat's top political advisor. Mansur Hasan entered the spotlight not long ago with the recommendation and support of Mrs Jihan al-Sadat. In addition to his youthfulness and vitality, he is highly intelligent and has an extremely capable capacity for maneuvering and swift action. One of the advantages he has over the other members of the tight circle is that he is politicized. At various times in the past, he had Moslem Brotherhood, then Ba'thist then Nasirite leanings. Another advantage is his level of education, for he carries a degree in political science from America's Harvard University.

For a while, Mansur Hasan worked in the office of Sami Sharaf during the regime of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir. He then quit to devote himself to his father's perfume business, and soon became the leading perfume businessman in Egypt. As a result, he accumulated a vast wealth. He then decided to return to politics, armed this time with his business, his wealth, his contacts and relations with many commercial and industrial companies in Europe and the United States and his intelligence, political experience and supreme capacity for maneuvering. Al-Sadat has made him one of his closest aides. He entrusts him with delicate political, administrative and trade tasks and considers him "a model for the youth of which he is proud."

#### Jihan--Egypt's Isabella Peron

Mrs Jihan al-Sadat is no less influential than any of the members of the tight circle. In fact, she probably outmatches them all. She can thus be described as the "only man" who can say "no" among the president's advisors.

"The first lady," as the press and those around her insist on calling her, is a beautiful wife with a strong and disarming personality. She has high ambitions and exercises a lot of influence on President al-Sadat. But she does not acknowledge that and is careful to say in all her public appearances and interviews that she is quite distanced from politics. She also never fails to show her absolute support for her husband and his internal and foreign policies.

"The first lady" exercises her influence within the state through a network of offices which she had set up at the Al-Jizah palace where she and her husband reside. These offices are run by Ahmad Fawzi, the television announcer and husband of the announcer and actress Najwa Ibrahim. There are offices for domestic, economic, housing and political affairs. They deal with various affairs and receive complaints and reports on the various

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activities in the country. Mrs Jihan al-Sadat makes a special effort to call or have her offices call ministers to express observations on this or that matter, and her observations are almost tantamount to orders and instructions.

Speaking of the president's palace at Al-Jizah, it is actually two palaces which the president had seized from the legal custody imposed by the late President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir on the properties of big landlords and capitalists, including some of the Jews who have left Egypt. Although al-Sadat has ordered the legal custody revoked, his order did not include the two palaces he occupies.

The first palace belonged to the Jewish millionaire Castro, the second to the late millionaire Muhammad Mahmud Khalil, head of the senate during the monarchy. Khalil had collected in that palace priceless art treasures, including works by the most famous European masters of the 19th century. The late millionaire had willed the palace and its treasures to the state, provided that it is named after him and his wife. President al-Sadat, however, seized it and added it to the Castro palace then turned the two into presidential offices and offices for his wife as well as a residence for his British mother-in-law before she died. He moved the art treasures to another place in Al-Zamalik.

The "first lady" plays her role through her actual functions as president of a large number of official and social institutions and organizations. She is the head of the local people's assembly for the governorate of Al-Minufiyah, the Egyptian Red Crescent, the committee for the rebuilding of the Al-Qasr al-'Ayni hospital, the higher committee for the protection of antiquities, the higher committee for combatting cancer, the society of male and female student affairs, the society for the female members of the People's Assembly and the committee for the happy village of childhood.

In addition to all that, she finds time to teach as an instructor at Cairo University's college of literature. She teaches three courses a week, and is at the same time working on her Ph. D. in literature. Jihan comments on her university salary (40 pounds) by saying that a job holds some security for her because "no one knows what'll happen in this world." She finds time too to write poetry. Egyptian publications every now and then publish some of her tender, love poetry which she writes under the pseudonym of "Rihab Ra'uf."

Informed Egyptian sources raise suspicions about the "political and social role" of Mrs Jihan al-Sadat, saying that the Sadat family behind all those social facades has obtained "trade and economic privileges" which have made it one of the richest families in Egypt. President al-Sadat, however, denies this categorically, stressing that he is a poor man who has no other income but his salary. As to the gifts and donations he offers "from his own pocket," he says in reply that he is a man of ethics and

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character, that he is building his family as the Prophet Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him salvation, had brought up his family. "...among our traditions in Islam is that Khadijah, the Prophet's wife, was in business. Like Khadijah, my wife is in business too. What donations I make come from the profits of my wife's business."

In fact, the "first lady" is not satisfied with "business" alone. Her influence has grown to the point where she selects ministers. Eight members of the present cabinet are considered to be her men. They are her friend Dr Amal 'Uthman, minister of social affairs; Dr Mamduh Jabr, the family doctor; the interior minister Nabawi Isma'il; Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi, the minister of education and scientific research; Dr Mahmud Amin 'Abd al-Hafiz, the minister of tourism and civil aviation; Nasif Tahun, the minister of supply and internal trade; engineer Sulayman Mitwalli, the minister of cabinet affairs and the minister of state for local government; and last but no least Mansur Hasan, the minister of state for the presidency.

To be fair to the "first lady," it must be said that her influence is not confined to the presidency and the cabinet, but extends to tens of sensitive military and civilian positions which she had helped to fill. Among those positions are those of the chief of housing which is held by Lt Gen Ahmad Badawi and of ambassador Abu Sa'dah, Egypt's ambassador in London, who is a former senior army officer married to announcer Suhayr al-Atrabi. In the media, there are the positions of Safiyyah al-Muhandis, director of Cairo Radio, Tumadir Tawfiq, director of television, Aminah al-Sa'id at the AL-HILAL publishing house and Ibrahim Nafi', chief editor of AL-AHRAM.

Perhaps the closest description of Mrs Jihan al-Sadat and her influence is that she is the closest thing to Isabella Peron who ruled Argentina thanks to her strong personality, influence and absolute hold on her husband the general.

And so...In the absence of real democracy and constitutional institutions which are equipped and qualified to participate in policy- and decision-making, centers of power develop and grow. Eventually, those centers of power become a burden on the country and on the regime because their only roots are the ropes which they use to get closer to the individual ruler. Perhaps the tight circle surrounding al-Sadat is today a pit for irresponsible centers of power which act in the complete absence of state control and in disregard for or contravention of laws and regulations.

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EGYPT

NATIONAL COALITION GAINS GROUND, POPULAR SUPPORT

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10 Apr 80 pp 21-23

[Article: "The National Coalition Demands: Limitation of Al-Sadat's Powers, Freedom of Running for the Presidency, Adoption of Democratic Representative System"]

[Text] The Egyptian National Coalition [Al-I'tilaf Al-Watani] whose establishment was reported by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in an earlier edition is daily gaining ground and strength and attracting broader masses. Muntaz Nassar, member of the People's Assembly, has carried to the assembly the Coalition's demands that al-Sadat's powers be limited, that the parliamentary system be adopted instead of the presidential system, and that the freedom for running for the presidency be given. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI reports from Cairo:

A movement of gathering signatures in support of the National Coalition and the coalition's aims of preserving Egypt's Arabism, promoting democracy and developing the national economy for the sake of the people is noticeably active nowadays. The coalition was formed by 40 leaders representing various parties and currents, with the exception of the National party led by al-Sadat, on the eve of the opening of the Israeli embassy in Cairo and the beginning of normalization between Israel and the Egyptian regime on 25 February.

Circles close to the National Coalition estimate the number of signatures collected 20 days after the issuance of the declaration at more than 65,000 signatures by university professors, peasants, artists, writers, workers and housewives.

The signature-gathering campaign falls within the context of a wide-scale political dialogue which is taking place in various forms in the cities, towns and villages--the like of which has not been seen for more than 30 years. With the coming of the former shah of Iran to reside in Egypt at the invitation of al-Sadat, despite clear popular opposition, a new

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issue has been added to the three essential issues around which the dialogue revolves. These issues are: 1) to resist the Israeli presence in Egypt which exists at the expense of the national and nationalist interests of the Egyptian people; 2) the question of democracy which is represented in resisting the Impropriety Law and the other freedom-restricting laws; 3) the people's standard of living which is descending into a state of unprecedented impoverishment, to the point that people with limited income find difficulty in getting an edible loaf of bread.

The campaign seeks to collect 1 million signatures by the end of 1980. In so doing, the National Coalition aims at providing a practical answer to al-Sadat's claims that those who oppose his rule and are against peace with Israel are no more than 5,000 citizens.

#### Expansion of the National Coalition

At the same time, efforts among the various representatives of the national forces continue to seek the expansion of the National Coalition founding committee from 40 to 100 persons. Among the names that have joined the coalition in that context are 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Shurbaji, the former dean of the bar association; 'Abd al-Rahman al-Sharqawi, the well-known writer and former editor of ROSE AL-YUSUF; Muhammad 'Odah, the well-known Nasirite writer; Ahmad Yunis, member of the People's Assembly; Salah al-Din Hafiz, former secretary of the journalists syndicate; lawyer Nabil al-Hilali, member of the bar association; 'Abd al-'azim Abu al-'Ata, former minister of irrigation in the cabinet of Mamduh Salim and former secretary-general of the ruling Arab Socialist Misr Party which was succeeded by al-Sadat's National Democratic Party.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that the National Coalition Committee has begun contacts and discussions with the heads and members of the boards of all professional unions (lawyers, doctors, businessmen, pharmacists, engineers etc.) as well as with labor unions, cooperative federations and cultural and artistic associations.

On the other hand, Mumtaz Nasr, member of the People's Assembly and one of the prominent 40 founders of the National Coalition, launched a political offensive which derives from the coalition's strength. He submitted an official letter to the speaker of the People's Assembly which included the National Coalition's demands that the present constitution be amended in such a manner as to revoke the restrictions placed on the freedoms and rights of citizens and introduce provisions that would guarantee the people's participation in making the country's fateful decisions.

This letter, the first of its kind since President al-Sadat assumed power, represents the crystallization of a clear-cut popular will and desire for a constitutional revision—a will and desire that are entirely at odds with the will and desire of the ruling regime.

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Nassar Demands Limitations on Sadat's Powers

While the regime, acting through the ruling party, seeks to bolster al-Sadat's presidency and grant him more absolute powers without strings attached, the National Coalition's letter which was submitted by Murtaz Nassar last week calls for constitutional limitations on the president's powers and for making the president, the prime minister and the ministers accountable to the People's Assembly. The letter also seeks a change in the political system from a presidential system to a democratic, parliamentary one, the abolition of the post of the socialist prosecutor general and the revocation of the president's right to dissolve the People's Assembly, hold referendums and conclude and ratify international agreements and treaties.

The letter of the National Coalition, which has become known as "the letter of Murtaz Nassar," is being widely circulated among the popular masses in Egypt. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has managed to obtain a copy of that important constitutional-political document. The following is a full summary of that document:

Mr Murtaz Nassar says in his letter that the experience derived from the application of the present constitution, which was issued in 1971, has demonstrated that there is a need to amend it in line with the desire for broader democracy in Egypt and in a manner that would establish balance and separation among the three powers in the country. He cites firstly the constitutional dispute over the president's powers provided for in article 74 of the constitution with regard to holding plebiscites and issuing legislation in the event of "a threat that jeopardizes national unity or the security of the homeland or that would obstruct the state institutions from performing their constitutional role."

The amendment proposed by Nassar would clearly limit the president's powers, whereby the decrees by law which the president issues would be submitted to the People's Assembly. If the Assembly rejects them, they would be invalid.

The letter also calls for renunciation of the practice of plebiscites, because delicate and technically complex issues which are submitted to plebiscites should be discussed solely by the People's Assembly. By that, Nassar was pointing to the travesties of the plebiscites held by President al-Sadat, primarily the plebiscite on the treaty of separate peace with Israel.

With regard to article 76 of the constitution which confines the right to electing the president to the People's Assembly, Murtaz Nassar calls for an amendment of that article, so that any citizen who feels qualified to run for the presidency can nominate himself without any restrictions and without the tutelage of any institution.

Nassar also calls for amending article 89 whereby a member of the People's Assembly would have to make a choice between his government position and

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membership of the Assembly. He says that it is improper for a government official to be a member of the People's Assembly, one of whose functions is to oversee the government and bring it to account, while he is under the control of the executive branch.

Nassar also calls for amendment of article 115 of the constitution which stipulates the government's approval of any amendment to the general budget proposed by the People's Assembly. This stipulation, he says, detracts from the Assembly's right to endorse the budget and amend it.

He also wants article 126 amended, so that the People's Assembly will have the right to grant or deny the government as a whole, and not just one member of it, its confidence. This right would be consistent with "the constitutional practice applied all over the world" and would require the government to resign if confidence is withheld.

Mumtaz Nassar objects to the president's right to dissolve the People's Assembly, saying that broadening the base of democracy requires amendment of article 136, whereby the Assembly cannot be dissolved, for any reason, before the expiration of its constitutional term. He also objects to the president's right to conclude peace and alliance treaties as well as treaties which would entail modifications in the territory of the country or which relate to sovereignty rights or which impose on the treasury extra financial burdens that are not prescribed in the budget, before these treaties are presented to the People's Assembly. "This is normal procedure in all constitutions of the democratic countries."

With regard to the judiciary, Nassar calls for an amendment of article 173 of the constitution which says that "a higher council presided over by the president should oversee the affairs of all judicial organizations and establishments." He proposes that this higher council be replaced by a judicial higher council, because the present one does not guarantee the independence of the judiciary since it is controlled by the executive branch.

Mumtaz Nassar also advocates the abolition of the higher constitutional court and the turning over of its powers to the Court of Cassation. The aim of this proposal is to lessen the number of judicial establishments as much as possible because the country's interest requires that, so that the judiciary would be unified, not fragmented, and would therefore exercise full, undisputed power.

Finally, Mumtaz Nassar calls for the abolition of the position of the Socialist Prosecutor General, since that position has "created a kind of duplication with the regular investigatory authorities and should therefore be annulled in order that the independence of the investigatory authorities, which are part of the judiciary, can be assured."

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AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI had reported on the National Coalition in an earlier issue and noted that among the personalities which participated in establishing it are a number of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's comrades in the Revolutionary Council Command, a number of former premiers and a group of political, intellectual and patriotic personalities.

[The following is an inset in the above article:]

The Judge-Turned-Politician

Mumtaz Nassar is 65 years old and comes from a prominent Asyut family in upper Egypt. During his long career in the Egyptian judicial system, he was known for his integrity, independence of mind and his dogged defense of the independence and traditions of the judiciary.

Mumtaz Nassar has held prominent judicial positions. He was deputy chief of the Court of Cassation, the highest judicial power in the country. Toward the end of the era of the late President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, he was elected to the presidency of the club of judges.

During that period, a sharp turn took place in the life of Mumtaz Nassar. When 'Ali Sabri, then one of President 'Abd al-Nasir's chief aides, tried to absorb the judiciary into the Socialist Union, the country's only party at the time, Nassar clashed with him and then appealed to the late president to intervene in order to stop the encroachment upon the independence of the judiciary.

In response, Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir formed a commission of inquiry under Anwar al-Sadat. It was a severe shock for Mumtaz Nassar and his fellow judges when the commission--perhaps motivated by fear of 'Ali Sabri who had become the strong man behind 'Abd al-Nasir just before the late president's death--decided that the president of the club of judges and 125 other judges and prosecutors were "enemies of the revolution."

Nassar and the rest were relieved of their positions in what came to be known as "the judges' massacre." But this did not prevent Nassar from pursuing his career as an attorney. And as a liberal attorney who had a strong belief in democracy, he did not shy of taking on difficult political cases and defending political personalities and organizations which belonged either to the left or the right.

President al-Sadat, when he assumed power, tried to exploit Mumtaz Nassar in the defamation campaign which he launched against the late Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir. But Mumtaz Nassar took a position of great courage and integrity when he told al-Sadat: "I will not defame him, because he is dead now."

In one of the rare television interviews in which Mumtaz Nassar appeared, he said: "I am not a man who can be used. I am able to see the positive and negative aspects of things." He also denounced the defamation campaign



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against the late Arab leader, saying he agreed with 'Abd al-Nasir on certain basic issues, including the emphasis of the principle of Egypt's Arab character.

Perhaps the importance of Mumtaz Nassar in this decisive phase of Egypt's history is that he is in the forefront of the Egyptian liberals who believe that Egypt is an integral part of the Arab homeland.

When he left his position as a judge and turned into an attorney, Nassar entered the file of politics in very difficult circumstances. Since the early 1970's, he has been a member of the People's Assembly to which he was returned as an independent by al-Baddari district in Asyut. His independence, integrity and courage, however, have annoyed the regime, and several attempts have been made to get rid of his political opposition by tempting him to return to the judicial system as a lifelong president of the Court of Cassation. He was also offered a cabinet position on more than one occasion. But Mumtaz Nassar has rejected that. He feels that his return to the judiciary has become impossible since his entrance into the field of politics where he has taken certain positions which may place restrictions and limitations on his role as a judge.

Credit goes to Mumtaz Nassar for raising a number of serious issues at the People's Assembly--issues which involve the integrity of the regime and its positions on public freedoms and democracy. Perhaps the most important of these issues are those of the Al-Ahram hill and issues dealing with corruption and freedom-restricting laws.

In 1978, Mumtaz Nassar petitioned for a permit to establish a party under the name of "The National Front," but his request is still pending, since the regime feels that such a party would be outside the framework of "honest official opposition," especially since the founders of the proposed party include Mahmud al-Qadi (55), a former professor of engineering and one of Nassar's close friends who has distinguished himself as a skillful parliamentarian who courageously pursues corruption in the state machinery. On more than one occasion, al-Qadi has raised the question of what he described as the tendency of engineer 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman, father-in-law of one of al-Sadat's daughters, to abuse his influence in matters related to economic and commercial deals and the commissions resulting from those deals.

Mumtaz Nassar has aroused al-Sadat's anger when he gathered at his office in 1978 about 17 opposition members of the People's Assembly who joined him in signing a statement denouncing the Camp David accords. The statement was one of the reasons which led al-Sadat to dissolve the People's Assembly.

Thus in the latest elections, the regime mobilized all its powers to defeat Mumtaz Nassar in his district. Armed security forces were sent to the al-Baddari district to pressure the voters, while the governor of Asyut,

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'Uthman Isma'il, received warnings and threats from higher authorities, to the extent that he was told: "Your head is in one scale of the balance, and the success of Mumtaz Nassar is in the other."

Despite all this, Mumtaz Nassar's supporters were able to impose strict monitoring of the ballots to insure against rigging. As a result, Mumtaz Nassar was returned to the People's Assembly with only a few others who are labeled "bothersome" to the regime, while others were defeated by the force of rigging.

Mumtaz Nassar achieved prominence and publicity once again recently when his office was selected as the site for issuing a statement by the National Coalition opposing the normalization of relations with Israel. Al-Sadat was so angered that he attacked Mumtaz Nassar by name at the meetings of the political bureau of the National party.

Mumtaz Nassar is a gentle and likeable person. He is not deliberately provocative when he deals with political issues. Instead, he argues his case with the rationality of a judge and the skill of a lawyer, while constantly reaffirming his absolute belief in democracy and freedom of which Egypt has been deprived for long stretches of time.

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EGYPT

SECTARIANISM STALKS ACROSS EGYPT

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 11-17 Apr 80 pp 22-26

[Article by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's Cairo Correspondent: "The Winds of Sectarianism Blow Across Egypt; The Religious Groups Have Broken the Rules of the Game with the Sadat Regime and are Steadily Advancing to Grab Power"]

[Text] President al-Sadat's encouragement of religious trends in an attempt to clobber Nasirism and the left has given rise to fanaticism among Moslems and Copts and has triggered sectarian divisions and clashes of a bloody nature that Egypt has not witnessed before in its modern history. At the same time, the religious groups have moved in quickly to fill the political vacuum, and in so doing have revealed their intentions and demonstrated their determination to press on in order to make a grab for power. In the following report, a correspondent of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Cairo paints a panoramic view of the religious situation in Egypt, in terms of their political tendencies and the negative and positive aspects of relations between the Sadat regime and the various religious groups.

Egypt is in a deadly state of political vacuum. The regime of President al-Sadat has abolished the sense of Arab identification that Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir had planted in Egypt. Acting through the authoritarian parties it had created, the Sadat regime has failed to attract the vital sectors of society--students, youth, workers and the intelligentsia. To spite 'Abd al-Nasir, Nasirism and the Arabs, al-Sadat sought to encourage religious groups in a bid to bludgeon the Nasirite and leftist tendencies in Egypt. Today, he is reaping what his hands had sown.

The religious groups have grown in number and strength. They have mushroomed and filled the political vacuum. And now they have broken the rules of the game with the regime as they steadily begin to move towards the seats of power. The practices of the extremist groups among them have animated and fueled religious fanaticism in the country--among the Moslems and the Copts alike. The fanaticism was reflected in provocations, clashes and

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incidents which have been occurring throughout al-Sadat's reign and which have been taking on a mutual bloody character in the last few years. The measures taken to normalize relations with Israel and playing host to the shah provided the religious groups with two opportunities to flex their muscles in defiance of al-Sadat and his regime.

At the same time, the Copts moved to protest the "harassments" which they have been facing, and accused the regime of supporting and encouraging certain sectors of the Islamic groups. To give expression to the Copts' anxiety, the Coptic Church cancelled Easter celebrations and declined to receive holiday greetings. Pope Shunudah, in a gesture of protest, secluded himself in a monastery in the western desert. Members of the synod followed suit and stayed in their monasteries to pray for the deliverance of the Copts from their "sufferings."

In fact, al-Sadat is now facing opposition from all religious groups and currents, with the exception of one current within the Moslem Brotherhood. This opposition is taking several forms ranging from peaceful political opposition to armed violence, as recent events in Asyut have shown.

It is perhaps appropriate at this point to discuss in some detail the political aspects of the religious map in Egypt, so that Arab public opinion may learn what is actually taking place in Egypt and what is the regime's relationship with the various religious currents. We will begin with the Moslem Brotherhood.

#### Three Currents Within the Moslem Brotherhood

The Moslem Brotherhood movement is now represented by three major currents, each one of which has its own organizational setup:

1) The first current can be described as the "semi-official current." It has established relations in some form or another with the regime of President al-Sadat. It expresses itself publicly through the weekly AL-DA'WAH. This faction of the Moslem Brotherhood is led by 'Umar al-Tilimsani who is now in his late 70's. He began his professional life as a lawyer, and spent some 17 years off and on in prison or detention camps during the rule of King Faruq and later of President 'Abd al-Nasir. This faction supports the present regime on the premise that President al-Sadat was against Nasir's anti-Brotherhood measures and against the dissolution of the Brotherhood. The faction feels that al-Sadat is ready to permit it to resume operations, because he believes that Nasirism paved the way for Marxism and that Nasirism is the other face of Communism.

Al-Sadat and this faction of the Moslem Brotherhood believe that they are in a "holy war" against atheism, and that they must cooperate in order to elevate and advance the position of religion, and re-educate the youth in the religious tradition that would protect young Egyptians from ideologies and creeds imported from foreigners (Marxism) and from the Arabs (Arab nationalism).

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Al-Sadat permitted the publication of the weekly AL-DA'WAH in 1972. He has been telling the leaders of this faction that he will lift the legal ban imposed on the faction's activities, but that such a move takes time and that time is needed to "tame" the state machinery. In so doing, he seems to be placing the faction on probation. He has also intimated to them that he is inclined toward rewriting the laws and regulations of the state in accordance with the provisions and tenets of Islamic law, and that he will permit the members of the faction to participate in power, one way or another, pointing out that he was one of the first "free officers" who had established contact with Shaykh Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Moslem Brotherhood.

Al-Tilimsani and his group hope that al-Sadat will allow them to practice their religious activities. They feel that they have had enough of their "long winter hibernation" in prison. To draw them closer and tighter to him at the beginning of his regime, al-Sadat raised the slogan of "the state of science and faith," and included an article in the 1971 constitution to the effect that the shari'ah [Islamic law] is a fundamental source of legislation.

However, al-Sadat's initiative with Israel and the Camp David accords has placed that faction in a difficult situation, be it vis-a-vis the other Moslem Brotherhood factions and other religious groups, or vis-a-vis the state which is asking the faction for stronger support. Eventually, the rank and file of this faction began to attack the Camp David accords, first by insinuation, then openly, as pressure from religious public opinion began to build up. Al-Sadat was angered by their attacks, especially by their assertions that Israel cannot be trusted, and by the aspersions they cast on his minister Butrus Ghali for being a Copt married to a Jewess.

Tension between the two sides culminated in the interesting television altercation which took place between al-Sadat and al-Tilimsani last year, and which ended when the latter complained to God about al-Sadat.

AL-DA'WAH has been confiscated once or twice, but has been allowed to appear again. A tacit agreement has been reached between the regime and the Tilimsani faction whereby the faction would be allowed to express its rejection of Israel, provided that such expression is done "peacefully." Indeed, AL-DA'WAH advocates the rejection of normalization, but not through violence and bomb throwing, because that would mean that the state of Egypt would be forced to pay reparations for damaged Israeli installations. The companies and establishments of engineer 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman employ a large number of engineers and employees who belong to the Tilimsani faction, by order of President al-Sadat. At a meeting held recently in Alexandria between 'Uthman and al-Tilimsani, the former stated that the state respects al-Tilimsani's view of peaceful, not violent, rejection of Israel.

The Tilimsani faction makes up about 25 percent of the Moslem Brotherhood in general. It is concentrated in the big cities and includes big merchants,

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especially those involved in export-import. Among the well-known young members of the Tilimsani faction are journalist Salah 'Azmi and Muhammad 'Abd al-Quddus, son of journalist Ihsan 'Abd al-Quddus.

The Banna-ites: The Puritanical Faction of the Brotherhood

The second faction, which is half public, half secret, represents at least 50 percent of the Moslem Brotherhood. It is called the "Banna-ites," after Shaykh Hasan al-Banna. Among its prominent leaders is Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il (50), member of the People's Assembly. He is an excellent parliamentarian, highly educated, energetic and very active in teaching, preaching and meeting his supporters all over Egypt. Members of this faction believe that by spreading in Egypt and the Arab countries, the Moslem Brotherhood will ultimately transform the structures of society, including government and authority, into those of an Islamic society and state.

Therefore, the Banna-ites concentrate on proselytism and avoid involving themselves in the political hassle except in extreme necessity and in critical situations and crises which require a firm stand by the Brotherhood.

They say that they do not trust all the slogans raised by al-Sadat as long as he considers himself an extension of the July 23 Revolution and its concepts, which led to the crackdown on the Brotherhood. They also say that if al-Sadat is serious in realizing the slogan of "the state of science and faith," then why does not he invite them to participate in power, or at least allow them to oversee the ministry of waqfs, the mosques and religious education in the universities? They believe that the stick-and-carrot policy which al-Sadat is now pursuing with the Moslem Brotherhood is calculated to narcotize them, and then to use them to clobber the rest of the political forces that are opposed to al-Sadat.

When the Camp David accords were signed, the Banna-ites took that to be the final wedge between them and al-Sadat, and began a decisive, clear and open opposition to his regime. The magazine AL-I'TISAM, with its Brotherhood aura, could easily be their mouthpiece.

Of all the other Moslem Brotherhood factions, this one is notable for its ability to deal with various non-religious issues, including such things as fashion, from an Islamic point of view. This approach derives originally from Hasan al-Banna's belief in non-rigidity.

The Banna-ites are especially strong among professionals and university graduates. They are not the rabble-rousing type, and, despite their insistence that they are not a political party, they are effective participants in the country's political life. The Banna-ites carry out their activities through their own popular rallies and their control of a large number of mosques, especially in the countryside, as well as their actual presence in the political arena.

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#### The Mukaffiratiyyah and the Jahiliyyah of Society

The third faction in the Moslem Brotherhood movement is known as the Mukaffiratiyyah [plural name for a person who charges others with atheism and infidelity] and it falls into two groups. First, there is the Qutbiyyun group. The name derives from that of Sayyid Qutb, the well-known Islamic thinker who was executed by Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir in 1966. This group believes that Moslems are living in a 20th century jahiliyyah [the pre-Islamic era which was marked by paganism and ignorance] and that society must be "Islamacized" in a revolutionary manner, that is by re-invading it with the call of Islam. The Qutbiyyun believe that we are in a state of atheism, that some of us are aware of our infidelity, while others are not. They believe that it is their duty to win over those who are not aware of their infidelity in the battle against those who are aware. The Qutbiyyun are distinguished by their level of education and their cultural background, and they are concerned about the confrontation with the other nations of the world and with contemporary ideologies.

The second group of Mukaffiratiyyah is less educated than the first one. It does not make a distinction between those who are aware of their infidelity and those who are not. It considers the entire Islamic society to be in a state of utter jahiliyyah. To return society to the fold of Islam, it believes in "invading society" through the use of violence. But such a measure requires thorough preparation. The group does not consider it prudent to undertake an adventure which can be quite risky, and can lead to the same liquidation and dispersal which were experienced during the regime of Nasir and Faruq. There are no prominent names among the members of this group of Mukaffiratiyyah. The members are all against the Camp David accords and consider them in the final analysis to be an act of infidelity through and through.

#### The Moslem "Hippies"

Those then are the major currents within the Moslem Brotherhood movement. There are, however, other religious groups that are politically and socially active. In the forefront of these is the Takfir and Hijrah group which is an offshoot of the Mukaffiratiyyah current within the Moslem Brotherhood and which began its activities in the late 1960's. The Takfir group accepts the principle of the jahiliyyah of the 20th century, and agrees that society must be re-invaded violently with the call of Islam. But it does not agree with the Mukaffiratiyyah that they should wait until full preparations for the re-invasion are made. The Takfir group is a group in a hurry, and believes that real preparation will come through action and trial.

This group has therefore built its own Islamic community--a community which includes the vanguard of the "Islamic invasion warriors," and which disavows everything in present society. Accordingly, members of the Takfir group have left their jobs, families and studies and moved to caves in remote, out-of-the-way areas, especially in Asyut, Al-Fayyum and Al-Minya.

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In those closed communities, they lead a completely separate life in which they apply what they believe to be the rules and tenets of the doctrines and law of Islam. Each one of these groups has a prince (amir), and all of them pay homage to a prince of princes (amir al-Umara'). These groups were unmasked when the parents of some university girl students began to complain to the government that their daughters have not been showing up or have been married without the knowledge of the parents or the state.

In fact, the Takfir group, in its thinking, communities and practices, is closer to the "hippies" outside the Islamic world. To that extent then they are Moslem hippies.

Members of the Takfir group have been training on the use of arms in their remote communities. It seems that this group has offshoots in some Arab countries. Members of this group who work in Arab countries send two thirds of their income to the prince of princes to help fund its activities. They also engage in armstrafficking. It is said that members of this group, or similar religious groups, have had training camps along the northern borders of the Yemen Arab Republic, and it is not unlikely that the Egyptians who have participated in the assault on the Grand Mosque in Mecca last year belonged to this group.

One of the victims of this group was Shaykh Muhammad Husayn al-Dhahabi, a prominent liberal Islamic scholar at Al-Azhar and a former minister of religious trusts. He was kidnapped and killed by members of the Takfir group. A number of these members were arrested and tried. Five of them were sentenced to death and were executed in March 1978.

Salih Sariyyah and the Religious Coup

The Takfir group was preceded by a similar group led by Salih Sariyyah. The principles of Sariyyah's group were an amalgam of ideas from Shaykh Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Abu-al-A'la al-Mawdudi who died recently. Some of its principles also derive from the principles of the Islamic Tahrir (Liberation) party led by Shaykh [Taqi al-Din] al-Nabahani. This group has offshoots in several Arab countries besides Egypt.

Sariyyah's group believes that society can be changed only if power was seized. Once the state is under control, then society can be reshaped in the manner advocated by that group. One day, the leaders of the group thought up a plan for a bloody operation. Members of the group would seize the Military Technical School which prepares the intermediate class within the army, namely, the technical cadres which are in effect the nerve center of the army. Using the school's arms and uniforms, the insurgents would move out of the school's barracks in Al-'Abbasiyyah [an area of Cairo], head for the site of a public rally which was to be attended by President al-Sadat, his then prime minister Mamduh Salim and other leaders of the state, claiming that they had come to guard the president and his men; and then kill them all. The attempt was undertaken in 1973, but it failed. Some of the planners and perpetrators were arrested, and a number of them were executed.



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There is also the so-called "New Islam" current which embraces a number of Islamic groups that call for an "Islamic revolution" through the transformation of relations within society, on the premise that Islam is both a religion and a political state. Members of those groups are primarily active in scientific faculties in the universities, such as the faculties of medicine and the various sciences. They have also established themselves among workers and engineers in the major factories. Each cell has a prince (amir) and a number of cells, or a group, have a prince of princes. The present prince of princes revealed his identity last year and engaged in a confrontation with the state. He is the 37-year-old Dr Ibrahim Basyuni.

The New Islam current can be seen as a political, cultural and social movement. Its norm of operation varies between political opposition and violent political action, including demonstrations and so forth. This current has split into several wings. But the majority of those wings believes that there must be "an Islamic revolution in the fashion of Khomeyni's revolution." One of the wings advocates that the role of Islam should be confined to guidance, that Islam should not be monopolistic or exclusive. This wing is receptive to the idea of dealing with "unatheistic leftist currents."

The New Islam current as a whole, however, opposes the Camp David accords, and considers the peace treaty with Israel as an act of invasion and confiscation against Islam in Egypt and the Arab world.

One of the factions of this current is the Jihad group which has recently gained notoriety when one of its princes, though not the prince of princes, was arrested after a bloody shootout between him and security forces. The group was found to be in possession of light arms factories and depots. The arrested prince, who is called Al-Mughrabi, later died of his wounds. Some 350 male and female members of the Jihad group are now in detention.

President Anwar al-Sadat began to release Moslem Brotherhood prisoners in 1972. The latest group he has released was the Mukaffiratiyyah group whose members were freed after the 1973 war.

The Islamic groups presently make up between 65 and 75 percent of university students associations. They have many attractive means which are guaranteed to lure students to them. For one thing, they almost constitute cohesive university families. They print and distribute lectures, help needy students, and concern themselves with the various aspects of social life--not just the superficial aspects of life, as they used to do in the past, when members of these groups would harrass girls who wore makeup or fancy dresses. One of the latest manifestations of the activities of those groups is their success, for example, in discontinuing the showing of "Why Alexandria," (Al-Iskandariyyah Leih) a film by director Yusuf Shahin which tells, among other things, the love story of a Jewish girl.

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Religious Organization Led by Al-Sadat and Al-Qadhdhafi

Mention must be made also of the "official" or formal religious associations. In trying to stamp out the Nasirite and leftist currents at the beginning of his regime, al-Sadat set up religious organizations whose aim ostensibly was to perform religious functions but which secretly served the goals of the regime. But after selecting his friend, the late Lt Gen 'Abd al-Rahman Amin to be the head of these organizations, he was faced with the problem of funding them. For this, he turned to Libyan President Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi. Relations between them at the time were at their best. The idea appealed to al-Qadhdhafi who contributed several millions of pounds. A member of those associations received a salary of 12 to 25 pounds a month. To attract young Egyptians, those organizations went as far as giving karate lessons.

When the dispute between Egypt and Libya began to heat up, President al-Qadhdhafi stopped his payments, and a division developed among members of these associations and organizations. Seventy percent of them came out in support of Sadat, while the rest gave their allegiance to al-Qadhdhafi. The dispute escalated into bloody clashes. The pro-Qadhdhafi groups were responsible for the violence and for the planting of bombs in public places and government departments, which led to the death of many Egyptians.

With the passage of time, and as a result of a series of liquidation and crackdown measures, the activities of these groups began to disappear. Lt Gen 'Abd al-Rahman Amin died in 1978, and a number of the pro-Sadat members of these organizations joined the security and intelligence machinery, while others joined other religious groups.

Official Islam in Egypt is represented by al-Azhar. This huge religious establishment which began its life more than a thousand years ago as a Shi'ite institution under the Fatimites before becoming Sunni eventually, has generally been supportive of the ruling authority regardless of the identity of the ruler, with a few exceptions, and has taken anti-colonialist stands.

President 'Abd al-Nasir had withdrawn from the council of senior ulema the right to elect the rector of al-Azhar mosque. At the same time, however, he sought to develop al-Azhar by introducing the teaching of modern sciences in addition to religious instruction.

However, the influence of al-Azhar and other official institutions (office of the mufti and the offices of the imams) is gradually diminishing as a result of their near complete adherence to the ruling authority. This adherence can go to such lengths that the rector of al-Azhar did not find it embarrassing to issue a religious opinion in support of the peace treaty with Israel. This does not prevent us, however, from saying that there is within al-Azhar now a liberal opposition movement which seeks to liberate this important religious institution from automatic submission to the

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authority in power. This liberal opposition included a number of prominent ulema, including the late Shaykh 'Ali al-Khafif who was considered to be an extension of Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh. There was also Shaykh Muhammad Husayn al-Dhahabi who was liquidated by the Takfir group. Presently, the most prominent leader of this liberal current is Shaykh al-Barshumi.

Prominent Islamic Personalities

There are several Islamic personalities who wield important political influence and carry out significant religious activities, either within the framework of the Moslem Brotherhood or independently of all the religious organizations and groups. Among them are the following:

- 1) Dr Ahmad Sayf al-Islam al-Banna, son of Shaykh Hasan al-Banna. He has a doctorate in law and is a strong and open-minded religious personality. There is depth in his religious knowledge and in his modern view of society. Dr al-Banna is in his forties, and is the most likely candidate for the task of reunifying the various currents of the Moslem Brotherhood.
- 2) Dr Hasan al-Hanafi, a professor of Islamic philosophy at Cairo University. He represents the enlightened school of Islamic thought, and sees Islam as a social groundwork on which a modern society can be built. He is strongly against using Islam to serve those who collaborate with Zionism and the United States.
- 3) Dr Muhammad 'Amarah, a university professor of Islamic history. Hanafi and 'Amarah are members of the opposition leftist Rally [al-Tajammu'] party led by Khalid Muhyi al-Din.
- 4) Dr Mahmud Isma'il, a professor of Islamic history at 'Ayn Shams university.
- 5) Shaykh Muhammad Kishik, imam of the Al-Khalifah al-Ma'mun mosque. With Shaykh Mahmud 'Id, imam of Al-Salam mosque in Alexandria, he is the most daring mosque speaker in Egypt. The two imams criticize the authority in their daily activities. They command a large following, and their sermons are recorded on cassettes and sold on the streets and in public places. Their cassettes compete in popularity with the recorded songs of 'Abd al-Halim [Hafiz] and Shadiha. Their speeches mention President al-Sadat by name and include religious and political criticism.

In addition, there is a new trend in the enlightened current of Islam which sees Islam in the content of a nationalist and socialist Arab movement. The most prominent representatives of this trend is Dr Muhammad Ahmad Khalafallah, who is also a member of the Rally party.

The Coptic Church: A Perennial Supporter of the Regime

According to the latest official census in Egypt, the Copts number only 2.5 million people. Their real number, however, falls between 6 and 8 million, out of a total population of 42 million.

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The religious Coptic institution includes several currents and trends. There is first the Coptic Church, then there are the liberal opposition, the Christian groups and the separatist movement abroad. The Egyptian Coptic Church belongs to the Orthodox faith, but it is independent of all other Churches in the East or the West. It played a prominent patriotic role during the battle against British colonialism.

Pope Shunudah (57), who assumed the papacy in 1971, holds wide religious powers. He is a graduate of the philosophy department of Cairo University's College of Arts and Literature. He worked for a while in journalism, and, in addition to studying theology, he fought with the Egyptian army in the 1948 war.

Another leader of the Coptic Church is Father Samuel (60), who is one of the sharpest political brains in the church and is considered to be the church's foreign minister, since he is entrusted with dealing with the state over the most difficult and serious issues. He is widely active on the social level and has strong contacts with the World Council of Churches.

Despite the patriotism of the Coptic Church, it is careful at all times to maintain good and strong relations with the ruling power in Egypt, regardless of its identity. Accordingly, the Church adopted a vague attitude toward the Camp David accords and the peace treaty with Israel. It did not formally support them, but declared that it supports peace. At the same time, it prohibited pilgrimage to Jerusalem until the Coptic Church there is retrieved.

As a result of this compromising attitude, several crises have developed between the Church and its followers. While certain groups are pulling the church to a position of stronger support for the state (Butrus Ghali and Fikri Makram'Ubayd), other groups want it to be more expressive of the patriotism of the Christian street and to reject peace and normalization with Israel more strongly.

It is known that Fikri Makram 'Ubayd, secretary general of the regime's party (the National Party), has been a friend of President al-Sadat since school days. He worked as a lawyer in cases involving the lifting of custody from properties, and as a result of these and other deals, in which he was joined by leaders of the regime, he accumulated an enormous wealth placed at 10 million Egyptian pounds.

Dr Butros Ghali, minister of state for foreign affairs, comes from a well-known Coptic family. His grandfather, Butrus Ghali Pasha, was a prime minister who was assassinated by Egyptian patriots in 1910 for his collaboration with British colonialism. Minister Butrus Ghali likes occasionally to refer to this in jest by saying: "I am a descendent of a treasonous family."

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The liberal opposition demands a democratic and open church. It is represented by Hegumen Matta al-Miskin who espouses a leftist orientation combining socialism and the teachings of Christ.

There is also Father Anastasi who is active in Alexandria. He is more liberal than the others and calls for a clear position on the Camp David accords, because the Copts have been accused of being fervent supporters of the regime and of having participated with the regime--through Butrus Ghali and Fikri Makram 'Ubayd--in reaching those infamous accords.

Violence Encounters Violence in Upper Egypt

Christian groups are active in Upper Egypt where the major Christian concentrations are, especially in Asyut and al-Minya. Their activities are seen as a response to the activities of the Islamic groups. Clashes between the two sides reach the extent of armed violence and involve cases of attacking religious places, setting fire to them or throwing bombs at them.

It is painful that the regime and a number of senior officials and bureaucrats have encouraged sectarian hostility, one way or another. For example, 'Uthman Isma'il, the governor of Asyut, believes that Egypt has three enemies, Communism, the Copts and the Jews, and that without eliminating them, atheism cannot be eliminated. Yet, however, the governor approves of and supports the Camp David accords.

In encouraging the emergence of the religious current in the country as a counterforce against Nasirism and the left in general, President al-Sadat has overlooked the emergence of fanatical trends which have been responsible for the sectarian incidents that erupt every now and then.

Perhaps one of the serious and unusual developments in the Egyptian society is that the extremist religious groups among the Moslems and the Christians are arming themselves on a large scale. Occasionally, they use arms in the clashes between them--a situation which threatens to trigger a sectarian or religious war. But while acknowledging that the situation is serious, most observers in Cairo are not inclined to believe that a religious war similar to the war in Lebanon is possible, because of the vast predominance of Moslems in Egypt and because Egypt is a flat and open country that cannot lend itself to that kind of civil wars.

Meanwhile, a separatist trend is growing among Coptic emigres, and it is being fed by the instances of state discrimination against a Coptic citizen in favor of a Moslem one.

The Role of Zionism and the United States

Zionism has exploited this separatist spirit among some of the Coptic groups in the United States and Canada and has sought to fan it up with the hope of creating sectarian sedition or explosions in Egypt.

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Domestically, in order to widen the rift between the Moslems and Copts, the Israeli propaganda which is directed at the Arab world, and especially at Egypt, urges the Copts to adhere to their religion and traditions. There are also American "academic" studies and seminars, some of which are even held in Cairo, which seek to examine the "distinctions" between the Moslem and Coptic communities and crystallize them.

The separatist trend is being assailed by the Coptic Church and broad sections of the Coptic population as well as by some of prominent Copts, primarily Dr Rushdi Sa'id, professor of geology at Cairo University. That is why the separatist movement also attacks the Coptic Church.

When the Egyptian national movement began to take shape at the turn of the century, the Copts began to consider themselves a religious minority, and they opposed the Egyptian national leader Mustafa Kamil when he set out to emphasize the Islamic bond which existed between Egypt and the Ottoman state. Soon, however, they fully participated in the Egyptian national movement when its leadership passed to the Wafd Party under the leadership of Sa'd Zaghlul. Sa'd raised the slogan of unity between the two components of the nation--the Moslems and the Copts. The slogan remained in effect after the death of Sa'd Zaghlul in 1927. Makram 'Ubayd (the elder brother of Fikri Makram 'Ubayd) was secretary general of the Wafd party under Mustafa al-Nahhas who succeeded Zaghlul as the leader of the party.

The honeymoon between "the two components of the nation" continued until the revolution of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir in 1952. The free officers did not include a single Coptic officer. Copts were suspicious of 'Abd al-Nasir's Islamic, then Arab, tendencies, but they were happy with his clash with the Moslem Brotherhood in 1954. Although Copts in general were not enthused about Nasir, their mass-base welcomed his social accomplishments.

Coptic suspicions were reinforced when the Sadat regime sought to stoke up religious sentiment in Egypt in order to strike at the Nasirite and leftist current. Copts are extremely worried nowadays as they see the religious tide rising to a level higher even than the level of strength reached by the Moslem Brotherhood in the first half of the 1940's.

Actually, it is difficult for a political observer or social researcher to detect basic distinctions between the Copts and Moslems in Egypt. The customs, traditions and psychological makeup of both groups are intertwined and nearly the same. The Copts, as a minority, feel however that they do not occupy leadership positions in the state in proportion to their numerical percentage of the population. Therefore, they have turned to the professions, trade, medicine and pharmacy. Their economic standard is slightly higher than that of the Moslems. In terms of political activism, they have gone back to rallying around their religious institutions and insulating themselves since 1952. However, a notable percentage of their educated youth has adopted leftist leanings, especially Marxism, while others have emigrated to the American continents.

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At any rate, the Copts are generally attached to their homeland, and large sectors of them refuse to be identified as a distinct community or minority and to have their affairs discussed on that basis so long as they speak the same language and are an integral part of the same society.

[The following is an inset in the above article]

#### The Believer President

President Anwar al-Sadat likes to reaffirm at all times his faith and his attachment to his religion. To that effect, he advertizes his visits to mosques for prayers. When he performs a prayer, he mutters and hems and sways as if overcome by religious fervor. Al-Sadat says that he fasts on Mondays and Thursdays, although those close to him doubt this and say that his fasting, if any, is probably due more to health than religious reasons.

Al-Sadat adds a touch of sufism and piety to his Islamic belief, saying that he retreats for prayers and meditation, and that he reads the entire Koran once a month. He memorizes a number of verses which he virtually chants out in his televised speeches and addresses. He is also proud of the dark indentation on his forehead, which he ascribes, like any deeply religious man, to the frequency of his prayers and bowing down in worship.

When he goes to a mosque, he chooses a spot closer to the wall rather than the front row before the mihrab, for security reasons. He surrounds himself with 5 rows of his secret servicemen. These, however, do not perform the rites of prayer so that they may be fully attentive to his protection.

Al-Sadat's critics and foes express a great deal of doubt about the depth of his religious belief. They say that he was known to have a fascist tendency in his youth, citing his attempt to establish contact with the Nazi forces marching on Egypt across the desert.

As for his contacts with the Moslem Brotherhood and Shaykh Hasan al-Banna, about which he always likes to talk, critics say that he was assigned to establish such contacts when he was a member of the "Iron Guard," the secret organization which King Faruq had created within the army. Al-Sadat, however, denies that he ever was a member of the "Iron Guard," emphasizing that he was an early member of the free officers organization. But it has been established that President 'Abd al-Nasir became acquainted with him at a late stage of the game.

The religious groups bitterly criticize President al-Sadat and cast doubt on the sincerity of his religious belief, citing the fact that he drinks alcohol, that he has allowed his wife Jihan to dance with the American president and to receive famous movie stars and singers in Egypt.

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President al-Sadat is known to be a connoisseur of alcoholic beverages, especially vodka. During his trips to the Soviet Union in the 1960's, he used to compete with President Leonid Brezhnev in vodka drinking. Some of those who witnessed some of those drinking matches say, however, that Brezhnev used to outdrink al-Sadat with his ability to put away enormous amounts of vodka.

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MAJOR ISSUE AFTER ABORTIVE RESCUE ATTEMPT

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 16 May 80 pp 87, 91

[Article by Jean Lartegury]

[Text] After the striking failure it has just suffered in Iran, what can America do now? Stiffen a resistance which is already fragmentary, badly organized, whose leaders are tearing each other to pieces? To rely on a terrified people who have not sufficiently mustered up courage, rekindled enough national sentiment to free themselves? Or to settle this Iranian question which is running the risk of infecting the remainder of the East, among adults, with the Russians and eventually Westerners and Iraq?

I approached one of the most credible leaders of this resistance, Shapur Bakhtiar, on his return from Bagdad, to ask him what he thought of the situation to which the "Blue Sky" failure had given rise. "Bani-Sadr," he told me, "and Khomeyni, this is solely Khomeyni. Alone the former amounts to nothing any more than does that cheeky whippersnapper, Qotbzadeh and all the others."

The Next To Revolt Will Be Iraq

The very fact that the Americans, these past few months, believed that they could attempt to accomplish something with them goes to show that they do not understand our country at all. And have learned nothing. Right after banking everything on Khomeyni, they were reduced to such a serious situation as to resort to their errand boys.

Iran is courting disaster, led by such mullahs as this Bohesti who is an outright Rasputin, who wants nothing but power and to revel in it, nothing else. But the Iranian people, and this is new, heartening, are beginning to overcome their fear. They dare to speak out, to meet. The bazaar, the army, the administration, the state police force, in short, everyone else, officials, students, are all waking up. They no longer want Khomeyni and his inner circle. They realize that their power is due to a few thousand loafers and poor devils who will be of use to them as long as they can pay them and feed them. But money is getting scarce. Iran is producing only 1.2 million barrels of oil a day (they are even talking about reducing it to 500,000 barrels) of which half is used for domestic consumption. How are the mullahs going to pay their dependents and their shock troops?

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"What have you learned during your recent stay in Iraq?"

"That the Iraqis do not want a single inch of Iranian territory; but they are hitting back as hard as they can against the mullahs who want to carry their Islamic revolution into their country. They are arming the Kurds, they are stirring up unrest among the frontier tribes and they will look favorably on any change of government in Iran. Saddam Hussein did not conceal that from me. Can you blame him for this? If the Iranians are not rid of Khomeyni and his mullahs in 6 months, we are running a very bad risk."

"Such as being broken up, divided into spheres of influence between Russians and Americans?"

Shapur Bakhtiar preferred not to answer this question but he is sure that should a revolt break out, it will start from Iraq. More than 1,000 Iranian officers have already assembled there. And it is not to go fishing in the Euphrates.

After the failure of the "Blue Eagle" operation, will the Americans, this time around, help the Iranian opposition attempt a coup d'etat, giving Iran this last chance?

Here they are, half doctors, half scoundrels, installed at the bedside of this very old country which is in its agony. If they cannot cure the patient, and there is no longer any hope, they will divide the spoils with the others. The two great nations, the USSR and the United States, will have the right to the lion's share and the crumbs will go to all those of lesser importance who have an interest in the inheritance: the French, Japanese, Germans, all of whom need Iranian oil. And the neighbors, Pakistan, and in particular, Iraq, which has only to cross a turbulent river, the Shott el Arab, to take possession of the rich Khuzestan deposits and the Abadan refinery.

Only Afghanistan is absent from the roll call, kept away by a still more dreadful misfortune and which will soon no longer exist as a free country. Otherwise, it would have been there to lay claim to Mashhad. In the meantime, the big game carvers lie in wait and as soon as anyone steps forward, they roar and put up a fight.

Iraq had hardly ventured to launch a commando raid in Khuzeshan, to pound the Iranian frontier villages with bombs, to fly its Migs over an abandoned area than it had to withdraw at once.

It was neither injuries nor Khomeyni's hysterical denunciations, nor the threats to summon all the Shi'ites, who make up the majority of Moslems in the country to a Holy War that caused this retreat. Still less was it fear of the Iranian army. When I was in southern Iran, 8 months ago, and there met Admiral Madani, commander-in-chief of the navy, governor of Khuzestan, despite what he told me about it, this army already no longer existed.

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For the Iraqis, there is no longer any responsible military commander; no one but excited mullahs and their followers who tear each other to pieces. The oil workers, who belong to the all-powerful nationalized company, the NIOC [Nationalized Iraqi Oil Company], as Marxists sympathizers, are increasingly more intolerant of any intrusion, particularly by unqualified religious persons, in a field which they consider reserved. We could hardly count on their levy en masse to defend the holy soil of the country which they confuse with their rights, of which they are being deprived because of their lack of piety and rare visits to the mosques.

On the other hand, all the Arabs in the province, the more than a million Khuzestan "Arabys," in tatters and wretchedly poor, over worked and underpaid by the Iraqis and the Palestinians, have, on several occasions, revolted. Hundreds of deaths have occurred in the chaotic free-for-all without anyone having the slightest idea of who had won. The Arabys have received large supplies of arms for, since no one any longer keeps watch over the Iranian border, this gun-running posed no problem.

And it is the same Khuzestan "Arabys" who seized the Iranian Embassy in London and demanded the release of some of their leaders held in exchange for Iranian diplomats.

But in reply, the Ayatollah Khalkhali shot down some of their men and wished the diplomats held as hostages a holy and happy martyrdom. Iran is engulfed in confusion. In Tehran, revolutionaries and leftists are killing each other. In the provinces, gang leaders are turning into feudal lords. Stocks are running out, the countryside is no longer under cultivation. The Kurds do only what they please. The same holds for the Turkmenes and the Baloutches; the Azerbaijan no longer recognizes Khomeyni's authority. Tabriz, for all practical purposes, has seceded; the powerful tribesmen, whom the shah deprived of leadership, are regaining their independence and are arming themselves for the quarry. Parties of soldiers and non-commissioned officers in some areas are settling down as Soviets, and are joined by some officers who have not given up hopes of finally seeing the mullahs lined up before the firing squads.

#### The Russians Have Already Made Their Choice

Faced with a situation such as this, the Soviets have apparently decided to take advantage of the opportunity to get a foothold in Iran. They have just "transferred their personnel" from the Tehran embassy. They have sent their most outstanding experts there, placed under the command of a distinguished member of the Central Committee set up there.

Pressured by public opinion and by his electoral failures, Carter can no longer play for time. His weak political policy has disheartened those in Iran who, while officially condemning American imperialism, hoped to come to an agreement with him in order to ward off any Russian danger.

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And Iranian chaos, in turn, is discouraging Americans from risking any strategic move whatsoever.

The Russians, as they do all over the world, are pushing their food soldiers as far as they can without running the risk of even any carefully veiled military action which could trigger an open defiance--something they fear as much as do the Americans. For the moment, they are concerned only with that which is of no concern to anyone else: northern Iran, Azerbaijan, Gilan, the steppe, the Turkmenes and everything in the south, the Iranian Baluchiestan, which makes it possible for them to have a gallery overlooking the Gulf. But they will not, without active opposition, allow America and its allies, through the intervention of any liberator whatsoever (Shapur Bakhtiar or the Iraqi Saddam Hussein, for example) to touch the Khuzestan oil fields. For the time being, they first want gas, secondly, that they be given a free hand in Afghanistan, and thirdly, that no one take too keen an interest in their intrigues with the Kurds and the Azerbaijani. I wrote it right here, some months ago, that short of a miracle--and it is hard to see where it would come from after Bani-Sadr's failure to stabilize the country's political life, and the Sky Blue commando's inability to free the hostages--Iran is doomed to split up into spheres of influence, to break up into independent regimes, into fiefs, into self-governing territories that it will have to support, arm and pay. The Russians have already chosen their dependents, America is still wavering.

This is a subtle, touchy, dangerous policy in which one single mistake could trigger a disaster.

Moscow, by taking advantage of Watergate and Nixon's impeachment, was able to ensure its North Vietnamese ally's victory over the South. Later, by playing on Carter's better feelings, it could start the Vietnamese on their conquest of Cambodia, on the annexation of Laos. By taking advantage of the problems which Carter's reelection pose and the hostage situation, the Russians can even be brought around to risk a similar and as bold an operation in Iran.

This is an area with which they are perfectly familiar; they will easily find backers there and if need be, can invent some. In Azerbaijan and in Soviet Turkmenistan they speak the same language as on the other side of the border. The Palestinian allies assure the Soviets their non-operational zones in the Arab countries, Qadhdhafi in Maghreb, the Cubans and East Germans, in Africa. In a word, within a few months, Afghanistan will be completely subdued at the price of some million deaths.

By taking advantage of the last months of the Carter administration, the Russians will not fail to create definite situations to make sure of the greatest number possible of promises, in order, later on, to negotiate the power positions with the occupant--whoever he may be--of the White House. At the Kremlin, they must think that liberal democracies are easy to exploit. They will not wake up until their allies are already massacred and there is nothing negotiable left within their feeble grasp.

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REPORTAGE FROM 'MARTYRED' CITY OF SANANDAJ

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 17 May 80 pp 122-125

[Article by Christian Hoche, special correspondent in Kurdistan: "Exclusive Report: In Sanandaj, Martyr City"]

[Text] The town of Khalif Tarkher is only a pile of brown buildings now. It is also a landmark along this "Ho Chi-Minh trail" which runs across the Kurdish mountains at over 3,000 meters in altitude.

Abruptly Fari, our guide, screamed: "Watch out, helicopter ahead!" The Pechmergas [Kurdish resistance] section rolled down the side of the crest. Henri Bureau of the SYGMA agency lay flat behind a rock. Jacques Haillet threw himself down in the bed of dry watercourse. We felt stripped in the face of this machinery of death which hems in the combatants of Kurdistan. Finally there was silence as the Cobra [gunship] disappeared into this fabulous horizon of distant passes and compacted snow.

"Democracy for Iran, autonomy for Iranian Kurdistan," Dr Abdelrahman Chassemlou, secretary general of the PDKI [Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan], told us in Mahabad with that unshakable conviction that "nothing, henceforth, nothing will be able to make a people in the process of being murdered give ground." The war had resumed a month earlier in this ir-redentist province of Iran. Yesterday in Saqqiz, a subprefecture with a population of 45,000 we entered a ghost town with 50 percent of its homes destroyed. The population has escaped the terror of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. A few old people have remained, burrowed in underground shelters. Packs of abandoned dogs howl fiercely each time a mortar shell falls on the city. The call of the muezzin is no longer heard: The two mosques were destroyed by the shells of the Iranian army.

"They are there!" With a vengeful forefinger Abbas, a deserter officer from an infantry regiment, pointed for us the barracks of the Pasdarans (Guardians of the Revolution) and of the troops of the 14th Division. Entrenched in rocky mountain peaks 1 or 2 km from Saqqiz they opened up with heavy guns without respite on 17 April 1980. A massacre followed: There were 90 killed, more than 200 wounded in a few days. "The dead could not be buried.

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"So, they were covered with earth in the courtyards of buildings." In the Pechmergas command post south of the city the operations chief of the PDKI smiles: "We number about 100 combatants, no more. Though ill equipped and exhausted, we are determined and are holding Saqqiz. Facing us are 1,400 troops and 800 demoralized Pasadarans who are well equipped with devastating artillery and air power. Despite it they don't dare to emerge from their fortress."

A Chinook [helicopter], flying very high, hovered over a deserted city. Before leaving this site of desolation very soon--to avoid being "located" by the artillery--Abbas told us: "You must admit that the shah never dared to commit crimes such as those of this Islamic republic."

We had been crawling along this difficult trail for 6 hours already. It is a thin communications corridor where each chance meeting is an unhopd-for stop. It is also a testimony. There was this man alone on the bank of a stream with a painful look: "On Saturday three helicopters attacked our village. Those dogs killed 53 persons, wounded 23, and abducted about 10 women. My two sons were killed. May Allah protect you!" Hussein and Hasan, who were in command of our detachment, clenched their fists.

Around noon for the first time the mountain rumbled for quite a while. The convoy came to a halt. The muledrivers made their animals, exhausted under the weight of crates of medicines and ammunition, take a rest. Fari said looking to the north: "It is Sanandaj that is being shelled. If all goes well we shall be there tonight."

With our muscles benumbed, our eyes reddened, our heads empty, we perceived Babariz. With a bunch of poplars at the loop of a stream, this shriveled village is one of the rear bases of the Pechmergas. It is the mandatory route that we have to follow before trying to infiltrate some 10 km from there into Sanandaj, capital of southern Kurdistan.

But first we were shown hospitality. There was scalding tea, wheat cakes, and yoghurt. All the village was there in front of the mayor's door. On the whitewashed walls were yellow photographs of the Vietnam war and likenesses of martyrs shot during the horrible repression last summer. The hamlet is controlled by the Pechmergas of the Komoleh, a Maoist and minority wing of the Kurdish resistance movement. Some of its members would soon be leaving on reconnaissance to clear the way for us.

A Wagnerian storm broke out. The sound of the thunder and cannonshot intermingled. "Despite everything we breathe more easily than in Tehran," the mayor sighed. Then came this dry command: "Let's go."

It was a false start. The reconnaissance patrol was challenged by the Pasdarans. The sky became illuminated with flares. A hail of shells came bursting a few hundred meters from our column. Hussein gave the order for us all to pull back. "We shall try later," he said.

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It was 0130 hours in the morning. We had slept an hour. We now had to march on the double if we wished to reach Sanandaj before daybreak. Not a word was exchanged, there was not a sound: The men of the Pechmergas took over from the mules for the transportation of the medicines. We forded an icy river with water rising to our waists. We halted in the mud before crossing the final peaks overlooking Sanandaj: "This is the most difficult part," Fari murmured as if to apologize. At the same moment a flare nailed us to the ground followed by very dense mortar fire. Had we been spotted? Undoubtedly. We were soon to find out for sure in Sanandaj when we heard a radio communication that the gunners detected our presence. "Shoot down those bastards," the commander of the 28th Division had reportedly shouted.

We scampered down to the eastern section of the city. Jeeps were waiting for us will all their lights turned off. They hurried across the narrow streets of the martyr city and reached the headquarters of the feddayin [commandos] (Marxist-Leninists), the third military force of the Pechmergas.

Item one: Sanandaj, contrary to the assertions of Radio Tehran, is entirely under the control of the Kurdish resistance. The whole city has been placed under the unified command of the Pechmergas. District committees were formed so that the civilian population (150,000 inhabitants) might survive and resist by all means.

Item two: This same population has been caught in the murderous trap laid by the forces of repression. As in Saqqiz, Baneh, and Sardas the Iranian army has ensconced itself on the rocky peaks and has shelled blindly, night and day, the capital of southern Kurdistan. In Sanandaj it has also sealed tight all the access routes.

Finally item three: Behind the "avant garde" (the literal translation of "Pechmergas") there is a whole people in arms expressing its hate of Khomeini.

With dark glasses and a bushy mustache, Medhi, one of the military chiefs of the feddayin, put down his Kalashnikov rifle for just long enough to swallow his hot tea. He was weary. "We lack everything," he said in a monotone voice. He had not slept for 3 days. "The economic blockade decreed by [President Abol Hasan] Bani-Sadr on our province is hitting us cruelly. We have no more gasoline or drugs. In a few days our food supplies will run short. Furthermore, as you witnessed, transporting these items here is difficult and dangerous. The army has cut off out electric power and telephone lines. Our hospitals have been shelled. Our ambulances are fired upon in the name of God. Since 19 April about 1,000 people have been killed and 950 seriously wounded."

A massacre of the innocents occurred on Tuesday, 6 May 1980, between 1300 and 1400 hours when a shell burst every 2 minutes. The inhabitants, stunned, burrowed themselves deep in the caves. All the city's peripheral districts were pounded on a large scale. In Abas Abad, for example, a town destroyed by the rockets of F-4 fighter-bombers, only a stack of rubble remains.

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Downtown, along the major thoroughfares, at the doors of Sanandaj, barricades have been erected. On the walls, everywhere, vengeful graffiti are displayed: "Death to the dictator of Qum!" "Long live the just struggle of the Kurdish people!" "Long live autonomous Kurdistan!"

The Shuhada ("Martyrs") hospital is a place to die. A 120-millimeter shell fell on the operating room last night. Dr Tabid, a physician of the Iranian Red Cross [sic--?Red Crescent], was despairing: "I have been a military medical officer for a long time. I have seen many wounded in my life. But I have never witnessed such sufferings: 90 percent of those hospitalized have sustained serious wounds. On the average we receive 150 wounded people a day."

A young woman had just had her left leg amputated. The child she was expecting died in stillbirth. She had energy left to smile. Shahin Bavafa, a very small bit of a woman, 30 years old, in charge of the hospital, beseeched us: "When you return to France cry out about what you have seen and ask, I beg you, that your government intervene so that this butchery may stop."

Night fell over Sanandaj. Before resuming our trek eastward on our "Ho Chi-Minh trail," Fari read us the feddayin bulletin: "Today there were 36 killed and 73 wounded. The Isfahan air base is on strike to protest the bombings in Kurdistan. Several pilots were shot for refusing to obey. Bani-Sadr has again mentioned the possibility of calling upon 36 million Iranians to crush the Kurdish insurrection. One helicopter was shot down over Baneh."

Near the icy river, after so much sound and fury, I recalled that Tom Thumb from the village of Babariz who sang: "Every house is a barricade, every hand a machine gun, every strike a grenade. Even if we are killed we shall never, never be disarmed." His father had died, his head blown up.

Photo Captions

1. p 122. Defying the blockade, the Kurdish people manage to bring by boat and on the backs of men medicines and ammunition to the cities besieged by the Iranian army.
2. p 123. On the mountain trails at 3,000 meters altitude, a column of Pechmergas and a supplies convoy try to bring relief to the population of Sanandaj.
3. p 124. One of the four barracks of the Iranian army which is pounding with its heavy artillery the capital of southern Kurdistan, Sanandaj, where 150,000 inhabitants are holed up in makeshift shelters.
4. p 125. Against Iranian helicopters and F-4 fighter-bombers Kurdish combatants only have light arms available.



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5. p 125. In one month there were more than 1,000 killed and as many seriously wounded among the civilian population of Sanandaj.

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LEBANON

PHALANGISTS TRIP TO DAMASCUS BRINGS TALK OF POSSIBLE UNILATERAL PEACE

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Apr 80 pp 24-25

[Article: "If There is a Unilateral Peace Between Damascus and the Phalange, Sham'un Might Join the Zagharta Rejection Front"]

[Text] While President Sarkis has been giving thought to formation of a "national union" government based on a rapprochement between Damascus and the Phalange, the Phalange has been thinking of a "de facto" government imposed by "a unilateral peace" with Damascus. The Phalange's dialogue with Damascus could bring a reshuffle of the cards and a change in alliances across most of the Lebanese scene, with the Maronite scene in the forefront. Each morning an aide to President Sarkis brings a collection of bulletins from the radio monitoring service and deposits them in the office of the president of the republic, along with a gist of the news highlights. Lately, the president has usually asked this about the tone used by the Phalange's broadcast in dealing with news about the situation in Syria and whether it was launching media attacks against the officials in Damascus. Last week, the aide recorded a falling off in the attacks by the Phalange broadcast against Damascus, and President Sarkis saw some good signs in this. However, the falling off did not last long. The President realized that the relatively temporary backing off had taken place at the time preceding the visit to Damascus by a Phalangist delegation composed of Karim Baqradi and Deputy George Sa'adah, and that the campaign resumed while they were in the Syrian capital meeting with 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, the deputy prime minister and foreign minister.

This behavior looked like a Phalangist attempt to pave the way for the visit, and then to make it appear that the visit did not necessarily mean any backing off from any positions prior to reaching an understanding on everything. While this behavior appears logical, the nature of the developments that accompanied the Phalangist contacts with Syrian officials once again put entente and an understanding with "the Lebanese Front" and Syria in an atmosphere of ambiguity. In this atmosphere, there was a blend of what was happening strategically and what was happening tactically, and of preliminary results and their impact on the efforts of the state for a political entente in Lebanon.

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Karim Baqraduni says that the visit to Damascus by the Phalangist delegation took place in a positive atmosphere prepared for through private meetings he had held with Syrian officials, having gotten authorization in advance from the Phalange Party leader Bashir al-Juamyyil, who had rejected such a move for several months.

Baqraduni adds that Syria would not accept the idea of the visit of the Phalangist delegation, unless this delegation brought a working paper giving a basic concept of what the party wanted to discuss with the officials and a sort of "announcement of intentions" about the major issues on the agenda. So, the delegation went to Damascus with a Phalangist working paper comprising 10 points dealing with problems on the Lebanese scene.

Phalangist sources described the working paper as a modified copy of the principles of national entente as announced by President Sarkis, particularly with regard to an interpretation of the unity of the state and the nature of cooperation with Syria. These sources summed up the points of the Phalangist working paper as similar to the principles of entente in focusing on the unity of Lebanon, rejecting partition and resettlement and dealing with Israel, rejecting the principles of Camp David and proposing the principle of cooperation with Syria on the economic and security levels. With regard to points of differences, for all practical purposes, they are confined to the following:

First: The unity of Lebanon is a decentralized union of regional entities enjoying independence in their areas with regard to development, finance, security, education and information. Phalangist sources say that this interpretation of the unity of Lebanon is the first announcement of what the Phalange seeks under the slogan of pluralism in union and that raising it from the start was designed to find out how far such an interpretation could be made reality with regard to the shape of Lebanon in the future.

Second: Rejection of resettlement means eliminating the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon and application of the agreements in the light of resolutions adopted by the Security Council whereby the Palestinians would remain in their camps awaiting a solution of the Middle East problem.

Third: A desire for developing economic cooperation with Syria that would translate the special relationship between the two countries and give Syria preferential treatment over other Arab countries, and a desire for a security agreement between the two countries on the condition that it would be confined to exchanging security information and to the context that the Syrian forces would urgently facilitate the assumption by the Lebanese army of its security duties in the Lebanese areas.

Questions Awaiting Answers

At first glance it might appear that the working paper which the Phalangist delegation took to Damascus did not involve final positions but was a broad step that the Phalangists want to use as an egress into a debate that would

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eliminate the Syrian "veto" over a dialogue with "the Lebanese Front" and, consequently, improve its chances for reaching power through a national union government, something that has been disturbing the sleep of the Phalangists since with divorce with Syria and the assassination of Tony Franjiah. This might effectively raise the following fundamental questions in the light of the start of the Syrian-Phalangist dialogue:

Are these negotiations taking place with the blessing of President Sarkis and what is his role in them?

Will Damascus accept the Phalangist gesture and what is the position of President Franjiah toward all this?

Will the nationalist movement accept this Phalangist leap and how will it deal with it?

Is there approval from President Kamil Sham'un and Bashir al-Jumayyil for all this that is going on and what is their role in it?

Ba'abda Palace sources think that President Sarkis had previously explained to President al-Asad on numerous occasions that he was unable to implement any security or political agreement with Syria unless it was based on the approval of the political forces in Lebanon so that it would be unanimous. Therefore, President Sarkis thinks that any understanding between the Phalange Party and the Syrian Government could be helpful in creating an understanding among the local political forces on the shape of cooperation with Syria in the coming stage.

President Sarkis also believes that any understanding of this sort would remove the Maronite complex between the Phalange and Franjiah and, consequently, help to bring about a national union government.

Ba'abda Palace sources say that President Sarkis had previously sent two letters with Baqraduni to the officials in Damascus dealing with his wish to request their assistance in forming such a government. The Syrian officials disclosed this situation to Walid Junblat, head of the Progressive Socialist Party, during his recent visit and it was reported at the time that Damascus welcomed the efforts of President Sarkis but felt that such an understanding must first take place through the nationalist forces in Lebanon.

Damascus' Objective From the Dialogue

Sources in the nationalist movement say in this regard that Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam had repeatedly advised them that the continuing dialogue with the Phalange Party was aimed at letting one wing get the upper hand over another within the party, in particular, letting the moderate wing of Amin al-Jumayyil get the upper hand over the extremist wing of Bashir al-Jumayyil.

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This may be what prompted a number of observers in Beirut to view the Syrian-Phalangist dialogue as sorts of attempts to make an interim gain from the two sides and not aimed at reaching major results for all practical purposes.

Observers say that eliminating the estrangement will achieve some relaxation though not alleviating the strong rejection by President Franjiah of any cooperation with the Phalange, the major issue in the efforts of President Sarkis.

Therefore, these observers believe that the objectives may be nothing more than for Syria to be content with a halt in the Phalangist information media campaigns against it and for the Phalange to lift the Syrian isolation and move on to the phase of putting pressure on President Sarkis to impel him to impose "a de facto government" in which the Phalange is represented, whether or not President Franjiah accepts that.

In commenting on such speculations, Ba'abda Palace sources feel that achievement of a Syrian-Phalangist understanding would enable President Sarkis to move on to the phase of forming "a national union government" and then he will have bypassed the current barrier imposed by the Maronite dispute by portraying the Maronite factions as in a convulsive state for personal reasons, not in a state of hostility based on specific principles. So far there has been no indication that Syria wants to terminate the dialogue with the Phalange. Sources in the nationalist movement say that Damascus expects this dialogue to go on for more than 2 months and that its continuation will only lead to setting in motion once again certain elements of the game in Lebanon while giving the nationalist forces freedom of action and not committing them to any preset positions.

These sources say that such talk suits President Sulayman Franjiah because Syria has also left him freedom to move the regime in the direction he wants and that he has had to ally with ex-President Sham'un who feels that the Phalange Party is trying to make a leap toward Damascus without him. In the regard, a Phalangist source says that it was Sham'un who made a leap toward the Palestinians without the Phalange which means that one is no better than the other.

#### The Problem of the Israeli Relationship

There is still one basic problem in everything that is going on, that is, the problem of the dealings with Israel. It emerged clearly from the Phalangist working paper that the word "dealing" means cooperation with the enemy against the Arabs. However, the Phalangist interpretation which Bashir al-Jumayyil gave in response to questions about this used as a premise the fact that dealing is not friendship and that there is no objection to friendship with the Israeli officials if it is based on mutual respect and if the Israelis supplied the Phalange with tanks and heavy weapons, this was not lackeyhood but cooperation to the advantage of the Phalange in its war against the Syrians and Palestinians.

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Can Syria accept this Phalangist interpretation of the dealings with Israel and be quiet about what is going on close at hand? Can the Nationalist Movement hear this statement, accept it and participate in a national union government with the pillars of the "Lebanese Front?"

Prime Minister Salim al-Huss says that the competition between Amin al-Jumayyil and Bashir al-Jumayyil has made political issues the objects of counter-bidding and objects to be twisted as either side sees appropriate. However, the truth must emerge in the end when a final position is fixed in any consultations on forming a new government.

Governmental sources say that President Sarkis' opening new channels of communications with Bashir al-Jumayyil as the Phalange's effective military force will once again bring him face to face with the problem of selecting who will represent the Phalange, or the Lebanese Front in general, in his plan for a national union government.

How will this current dialogue end?

Ba'abda Palace circles say that the Phalangist opening toward Damascus and Damascus' acceptance of the dialogue constitute a fundamental psychological switch in the nature of the dialogue among the forces in the Lebanese arena and some time will be required before passing judgement on how developments will evolve after they have been given all these new shots in the arm.

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LEBANON

NEW STRATEGY DEVELOPED IN AMAL MOVEMENT

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Apr 80 p 26

[Article: "Amal Reacknowledges Al-Husayni as Leader and Separates Black From White"]

[Text] A restructuring of the command council of the Amal movement, the military arm of the Shi'ite sect, is an attempt to give the movement an organizational form that is more disciplined and committed and more independent from the other Lebanese organizations and quarters, until the unknown fate of the sect's spiritual leader, who disappeared in 1978 on a visit to Libya, is cleared up once and for all.

Political observers in Beirut had felt that changes during the past 2 weeks in the Amal movement will reveal the new trends that have emerged and will disclose the form the movement will take be it with regard to persons or the principles laid down by Musa al-Sadr.

However, to the same extent that Amal has revealed new parameters of its present, it has left observers puzzled about the nature of the future of the movement and the role which it will play in the near future on the Lebanese and Arab levels.

The changes come more than 1 1/2 years after the disappearance of the Imam and after the expiration of the extraordinary regulations in conformity with the movement's internal structure on 3 April of this year.

However, these changes were in reality an attempt to rearrange internal conditions after the disappearance of the Imam and the emergence of new centers of power within the movement which were trying to exploit the new reality along personal lines and after the growing importance of the military forces and the intermeshing of relations with local political forces and Arab regimes.

But the speculations which appeared were caused by the emergence of specific factors that had sorted themselves out during the absence of the Imam, whether with regard to relations between the movement and the Islamic regime in Iran, distinctive relations regarding the other nationalist forces toward the Palestinian resistance and reports about the lines that has been opened

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in the name of the movement toward the Maronite "Lebanese Front" on the premise that Amal represented the Shi'ite forces in Lebanon. Through the meetings which it held and through the meetings which are still going on, Amal tried to lay down, in addition to the principles stipulated in the movement's structure, a strategy of action for the coming phase characterized by political activities bolstered by the developing military arm of the movement so as to dissassociate the movement from faraway names and elements of leadership with no connection with the struggle for the "unity of Shi'ite action" in this critical stage which Lebanon is experiencing.

Informed sources in Beirut disclosed that the Amal movement has elected a new revolutionary council, taking pains to keep the names secret despite names appearing in the information media that were intentionally leaked to define the nature of the faction whose position won in the recent changes.

#### Al-Husayni Reaffirms His Position

In the wake of the resignation submitted by Husayn al-Husayni, the secretary general of the Amal movement, in early April, many believed that this resignation was an indication that he was unable to handle his opponents in the other centers of power in the movement.

However, the results of the elections showed that he had returned to the movement's council although this return had limitations placed on it by powers given by the council to a collective leadership which would prevent its members from taking unilateral positions outside the framework dictated by the movement.

So, according to the sources, al-Husayni was able to carry out a coup within the movement against his opponents who had wanted to exclude him but found themselves outside the movement.

Informed sources say that al-Husayni chose his timing well to carry out a coup because of the atmosphere surrounding the circumstances of Amal's clashes with the Palestinian Fatah forces since there was a rallying of the ranks around its energetic, political visible face.

In addition to the nature of the change in the revolutionary council that now includes a group of young intellectuals, a large number of whom have a good chance of assuming leadership roles in the near future, informed sources revealed that Amal took care to portray what happened as an attempt to hand on the sword to its proper possessors, persons close to the supporters of Imam al-Sadr and a possible agreement by the young Sadri al-Sadr, son of the Imam, to head the movement in the absence of his father to give it a powerful thrust in the present stage; however, he declined to accept the post.

#### The Strategy: A Distinctive Independence

These sources feel that what happened within the framework of the Amal movement will primarily be reflected in its activity in line with the following strategy the broad lines of which were laid down in the succession of meetings:

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First: Playing up the independent positions of the movement and its capability of representing the Shi'ite forces on the national scene although this means taking organizational steps and changing the character of affiliation with the movement from the stamp of support to the stamp of party discipline.

Sources here indicate that the rallying around the movement by the Shi'ite families has from the start given it a capability to reach segments of the population in various areas; however, the nature of party action dictates transition to a more committed stamp than previously.

Second: Maintaining the question of the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr in Libya in August 1978 as the most prominent issue of the movement with the implication of a probable escalation of the confrontation against the Libyan regime in various ways.

Third: Defining the nature of Amal's move with regard to south Lebanon and the movement to firm up its grassroots bases in the areas south and north of the al-Litani River despite the sensitivities this might create in the ranks of the Palestinian resistance and the apprehensions it might feel about Amal's capability of absorbing the Shi'ite elements which are operating today under the banner of the various nationalist parties and forces.

Fourth: Finding a "balance" between the movement's relations with various Arab forces and attempting to move independently within the relations which link Amal with the political and military leadership in Syria and rejecting the principle of confining the movement's positions within the framework of the nationalist and progressive parties and forces, even if this means wiping out "its distinctive position."

In this regard, informed sources in Beirut indicate that the nature of recent developments has given certain nationalist forces the capacity of representing a certain denomination in a limited fashion although this representation has appeared greater than it really is on various occasions and in various circumstances.

These sources say that Amal has become "the Shi'ite side" in the nationalist movement in return for Walid Junblat's wish to play up the role of the Progressive Socialist Party in representing the Druze side, and in return for Ibrahim Qulaylat's wish to play up the role of the "Murabitun" in their representing the Sunni side.

Al-Khalkhali's Statements Indicate Displeasure

Fifth: Creating a stable relationship with the regime in Iran in the wake of the differences shown up by the positions of some Iranian clerics on numerous occasions, particularly on the subject of the disappearance of Imam al-Sadr and the attempt by certain religious entities to give the Libyan regime certificates of acquittal in al-Sadr's disappearance.

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Shi'ite sources say that the Amal movement was forced to deal with the statements of Shaykh al-Khalkhali that SAVAK, the Shah's intelligence agency, had liquidated the Imam in Italy by criticizing such statements that served the purposes of the conspiracy against Imam al-Sadr.

The Iranian embassy found itself forced to adopt the point of view of Amal and the Higher Shi'ite Islamic Council and view al-Khalkhali as representing only himself.

What happened about al-Sadr also happened when Shaykh Muhammad Montazeri, the son of Ayatollah Husayn Montazeri, tried to enter Lebanon at the head of a group of Iranian volunteers to fight beside the Palestinians in the south. This incident was contained in the light of Amal's announcement that there was no need for new volunteers in the south.

The first change in "the Amal movement" ended in the creation of a better balance in the leadership and in the creation of a clear and more flexible line in dealing with probable political developments.

There is still one point that is vague in this regard and it concerns the movement's relationship with "the Lebanese Front and reports that official intelligence circles have penetrated the leadership of the movement and are coordinating things with it to transform the Amal movement into a force opposed to the forces of the nationalist movement and the Palestinian resistance in the south and the suburbs of Beirut in particular.

With regard to this point, a prominent leader in Amal says: "What happened lately was to distinguish the white thread from the black and to exclude those whose activity coincided with the wishes of quarters that want to make Amal in to a new Phalange Party in the nationalist areas. We were successful in this and the results will appear in the near future."

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LEBANON

WALID JUNBLAT EMERGING AS A SKILLED LEADER

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 11-17 Apr 80 pp 27-30

[Article: "Walid Junblat: Which of His Father's Characteristics Did He Take, and Which He Did Not?"]

[Text] His father has been gone for 3 years. Has Walid Junblat filled the political vacuum left by his father? AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's Beirut office has prepared this report on Walid Junblat the politician, the party leader, the Druze leader and the head of the nationalist movement (the leftwing), and on how he looks at himself and how the Lebanese look at him.

"He is a new printing of an old book" was the comment of former president Charles Hilu when he saw Walid Junblat speaking to a crowd assembled at 'Alayh to commemorate the third anniversary of the death of his father. Those who watched these scenes on television sensed how much the son and the father resembled each other and wondered where Walid Junblat is now in the long process 3 years after the death of his father and after 3 years of hard work in difficult local, Arab and international circumstances. Who is Walid Junblat today?

He is the head of the Progressive Socialist Party, the Druze leader in the traditional family framework and a leader of the Lebanese Nationalist movement--the leftwing--and chairman of its central political council although he had earlier insisted on rejecting this capacity. Quite simply he is everything bestowed by his heritage from Kamal Junblat and the Arab and international circumstances he inherited. However, neither is he Kamal Junblat although he carries many of his traits, he is not Kamal Junblat despite his sophistication and he is not Kamal Junblat despite the broad horizons he covers while talking about political leadership, perhaps because Kamal Junblat was too big a phenomenon for a successor to embody and perhaps because there are men for each time and today is not yesterday.

However, the basic aspect that marks Walid Junblat today is that one time he will be almost a carbon copy of his father and yet at others diverge so far as to be quite different. His comrades in the party sensed this recently and it was confirmed to them that the young man's personality is still taking on new touches and the final image has not yet been formed. Members

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of the leadership of the Progressive Socialist Party say that Walid Junblat is distinct from his father in his flexibility, his realism and his simple treatment of a simple reality: while Kamal Junblat started from a base of romanticism blended with a rigid credo and and idealisms that only he could link with reality.

One member of the party leadership says that ever since the very first day after his father's death, Walid Junblat was careful not to claim that he was capable of succeeding him and, at the same time, was careful not to make his supporters feel that there was a vacuum in the political leadership.

#### When The Son Was In The Shadow Of His Father

Until the death of Kamal Junblat, Walid Junblat was just his son without this meaning any immersion in his father's political atmosphere. Politicians would often refer to the son, wondering why he was not like the sons of the other political leaders in Lebanon.

Some of them went so far as to say that Kamal Junblat had not given him any chance to play an fundamental role while others went so far as to say that Walid Junblat did not agree with his father on his policies and others knock his desire to plunge into the hazards of politics, making references behind his back to the fact that a young man who always wears bluejeans will not be excellent leaven within the progressive framework nor in the Druze framework nor in the Lebanese, Arab and international leadership. The fact is that it is unfair to compare Walid Junblat with Kamal Junblat because Walid is the child of today while his father was the product of a half century old political structure. However, despite all this, one can say that Walid has made headway that no one expected him to make with such speed.

According to a close friend of his, Walid spent the first month after his father's death in a period of contemplation of everything that would be required of him after he assumed responsibilities and received party and popular allegiance. After donning his father's cloak as a symbol of the family heritage of politions of leadership, he emerged from this period having made two fundamental decisions:

To benefit from the friendships of his father and to go beyond what he had inherited in the way of emnities to a broad policy.

To follow his father's footsteps without worrying about the difference between the two of them, hoping that the right circumstances would allow him to give prominence to his own distinct personality.

#### Walid Junblat, The Druze Leader

So Walid Junblat began the process of succeeding his father. He began where he was the strongest, within the framework of Druze leadership. He took care to avoid any emnities with the Druze families, particularly within the

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framework of the traditional al-Yazbaki-al-Junblati dispute to deepen the understanding of his transition to the seat of family leadership without damaging the standing of his rivals from the al-Arslan and other families.

He may have been helped in this by the fact that these families are also passing through a stage of defining the picture of their succession, their leaders having become elderly and the young people having begun to look to future roles.

Walid Junblat succeeded in this field. Although he is a confirmed bachelor, in the hopes of the members of the family he is on the verge of becoming a son-in-law of Amir Majid Arslan. Although he is the son of a leader who left no Druze room for prominence, he almost supports any ambitious Druze. Confidants of his say that this posture springs from the fact that Walid Junblat is a new leader, unafraid of any heir or rival, while his father was wary of fickle fate, having had long experience with the ceaseless rivals separating the Druze families in his area.

However, others view Walid Junblat's within his Druze context, as an understanding of a reality that has almost become an obvious manifestation, that is, the rise of Druze bodies comprising those whom Kamal Junblat never gave the opportunity to emerge and by enveloping these personalities, Walid wants to nurture and not to destroy them as his father would have done.

Walid turned to the party situation and found that no one could remember the name of a single prominent Druze personality in the framework of the party so he opened the way for a number of young people to rise as part of the operation to rebuild the party on new bases.

The fact is that Kamal Junblat left behind a sad situation within the party which some would almost say was the end of everything Junblat represented. This statement may appear to be true using the Lebanese party criterion since the personality of the head of the party overrides everything which opposes him and if he leaves, the party transforms itself into conflicting, quarreling parties.

Walid Junblat, The Party Leader

However, the death of Kamal Junblat gave rise to a feeling with some members of his denomination that it was essential to strengthen the party and party centers saw an extensive membership drive designed to tell those who had expected the party to die away that Junblat's principles of progressivism and socialism were stronger than his Druze leadership and firmly anchored in the hearts of his supporters.

So Walid Junblat began an extensive new reorganization of the party based on a huge budget and extensive protection so that the party was able to commemorate the third anniversary of the death of Kamal Junblat in the presence of 100,000 persons in 'Alayh who saw a review comprising 7,000 fighting men and 3,000 scouts armed with modern weapons.

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Aides to Walid Junblat say that his accomplishments today appear to be great compared with the strength of the party previously. They state that up until the outbreak of the Lebanese events, Kamal Junblat refused to let the party have more than 100 fighting men feeling that there was no need for such a force if the popular, democratic struggle really was the road for the party to accomplish its ends.

They add that Kamal Junblat agreed to increase this number to 200 when the incidents started and then to several hundred because of the huge responsibilities brought on by the events and the necessity of constructing a joint force from the nationalist and progressive parties and forces and the Palestinian resistance.

His aides say that the party's force never amounted to what it is today and that the party can talk about around 2,000 full-time fighting men in three battalions able to move anywhere in addition to the party's support force and militias in the mountain villages, quarters and areas. This force which Walid Junblat set up emerged looking like a new escalation of the party image in the third anniversary commemoration of the death of his father but it continued to reflect one of Walid's fundamental goals, that is, to create a force commensurate with current standards in Lebanese local politics so as not to be outshone in strength by the other factions of the "Nationalist Movement" and the hostile forces in the Maronite "Lebanese Front."

He took pains to define the role of these troops in the third anniversary commemoration since he said: "Until there are positive indications and objective prerequisites demonstrating that this political front has abandoned its suspicious links, that it intends to play by the rules of the game of democratic struggle, that it refuses to discriminate among Lebanese on the basis of denomination or race, that will respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, that it is convinced of the necessity of defining the Lebanese identity once and for all through Lebanon's natural position in the Arab body and that it wishes to observe the special relationship linking us with Syria, holding to the principles of mutual respect in sovereignty and independence--until we have this climate, we will remain cautious, will continue to be prepared and will hold on to our weapons as the one last guarantee of our existence. If need be, this weapon of ours will be directed to strike a blow at some suspect nests and shops [of dissension] in our nationalist areas which are causing trouble among the sons of the single trench. A strike will also be directed against some of those lurking in the shadows, waiting now for a long time for a phase of political relaxation to resume playing a specific role through their traditional or denominational or class position."

#### The Principle Of Balance In Relations

Progressive Socialist Party sources say that Walid Junblat's actions within the party context are governed by specific fundamental factors, namely:

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First: A desire to keep the party the strongest among the factions of the nationalist movement so as to preserve for it the major role in all political initiatives and for it to continue to be the fundamental axis in the power entente in Lebanon.

Second: A desire to create a political and military force for the party able to cope with any circumstances that could arise in the Lebanese arena and to create a Lebanese force able to be set in motion and eliminating the previous dependence on the strength of the Palestinian resistance as some factions of the nationalist movement have done so far.

Third: Playing up an independent position after a charge had been levied against the nationalist forces of allying themselves with any non-Lebanese party to stand up against the political aspect of Maronism which had its own force.

This position emerged in the interviews of Walid Junblat where he distinguished his party's position from the other factions of the nationalist movement and where he laid down a position independent of the Palestinian will and the Syrian will although he preserved the existing strong lines of alliance with them.

Fourth: Striving for a strong Arab position within the framework of the Lebanese regime which would arise from a broad dialogue with the various forces in preparation for firming up the climate of the dialogue far removed from any violence and paving the way for starting the democratic political struggle for the political powers required in light of the proposed national entente.

In the regard Walid Junblat says: "Entente cannot be accomplished through just a message on television; it must take on its practical dimensions and hasten to translate the articles of detente into reality." Walid Junblat is rounding out his difficult course with regard to relations with the other forces on the Lebanese scene. He is trying to be the conscience of the nationalist movement as his father was an is trying to work with the resistance in line with the principle "Support your brother be he oppressor or oppressed--deter the oppressor from his oppression and help the oppressed."

He has succeeded in supporting all the forces allied with him and, at the same time, in directing criticism at them when he felt that was necessary. Confidants of his say that he is the only one who can ask the resistance to halt excesses without having his position criticized as hostile because he, at the same time, can give them sincere, genuine support.

To a great extent such a situation applies to his other Arab relations, particularly with Syria with which he has been anxious to keep lines of communication open despite any disagreement of opinion.

Circles around Walid Junblat say that his relations with the Syrian officials are distinguished from those of the other factions of the nationalist movement by his ability to confer from a clear Lebanese position. This may be

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what has made his position remain distinct from the other factions with regard to the situation in Lebanon in the aftermath of the operation to reassemble the Arab deterrent forces since he urged using the Lebanese army although, at the same time, he urged "reforming it far removed from an climate of bids for support and recriminations." Some people in the government viewed this position at one stage as a sort of agreement to charging the army with security tasks without fearing the reactions of the other nationalist forces.

Political sources say about Walid Junblat that he has established relations of friendship with all the politicians, even with his opponents. His recent dialogue with Amin al-Jumayyil on the Frace (Antir) broadcast reaffirmed the necessity of creating a clam and democratic debate to arrive at solutions for the Lebanese crisis.

Walid Junblat has also established firm bridges with the pillars of the establishment and has taken pains to establish a balance in his relations with the palace and the parliament. He reportedly today can impose a set of positions without being put in an awkward position in the character of his relations.

He also has been able to announce his positions in every circumstance without fear and has always been able to maintain good relations with all political forces in Lebanon. At times, he is the representative of the nationalist movement in his indirect dialogue with the Lebanese front. At other times, he is the representative of the party in the proposed balance of political forces for entente. Often he is the representative of the Druze force in any attempt to establish a denominational balance within the framework of the state. He may come close and even match the personality of his father, Kamal Junblat.

#### Flexibility and Democracy

Progressive Socialist Party sources say that after the death of his father, Walid Junblat inherited the political situation which is the essence of the elements of the continuing crisis in Lebanon and, therefore, had to deal with it from the same position as his father with his leadership of the mountains and the Druze, of the Progressive Party and of the nationalist movement, in addition to alliances with the Palestinian resistance and the progressive forces in Lebanon, the Arab world and the rest of the world.

However, reality has shown that the nature of the practice of political activity has given Walid Junblat an advantage in flexibility so that he today can establish positions from which he can deal with various present circumstances without being put in an awkward position. That has established a new approach in dealing with political matters quite unlike the shock approach which characterized his father throughout his life. He also has established that flexibility is not abandonment of firm principles but an attempt to accomplish them without convulsions.

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Walid Junbalt today is trying to leave with his party people and his supporters the impression of democratic practice within the framework of the party and daily political action. He is also trying to get roles moving like the head of an orchestra who is interested in establishing harmony in many positions in conformity with one creed. In the nature of his work, he does not like to use up the stock which he is still working diligently and patiently to build up.

His confidants say that Walid Junblat is today in the stage of transition to the position of a prominent, responsible political leader and, therefore, is refusing to play the role of a messenger to the administration in a ministry and is also refusing to play the role of a seeker after quick gains in any field.

In response to a question by one of his friends as to why he was always on the go, he said: "You yourself have the right." For all practical purposes, this is an explanation of his desire not to lose his personality for the constant burdens of leadership.

The friend who asked the question commented on this by saying: "By constantly being on the go, Walid Junblat is escaping from the complex daily political life and having to deal with its tiresome details. In escaping, he is keeping for himself the right to define how he will appear on the political stage because the curtain has not yet gone up. He may also want to set the zero hour for being a major leader even if he cannot today be an important teacher like his father."

[The following inset appears in article on Walid Junblat]

#### Walid's Political Language

Walid's political language is frank, clear and decisive, put into short phrases. Following are his views on the most prominent Lebanese and Arab issues of the hour:

#### The Camp David Agreement

There must be a unified formula or policy on the part of all Arab countries to counter Camp David but I personally think this will be difficult and am skeptical that it will happen.

#### The Situation In The Area

We have entered a phase during which the foreign military bases will return to the area. The 50's were the great rebirth against colonialism and imperialism but the situation has changed today.

#### The Arabs And The Lebanese Crisis

Despite some positive features of the Arab decisions, I do not conceive of them as a sufficient solution on the Lebanese scene and I do not imagine

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that, at the present time, it will be easy to arrive at a solution for the Lebanese crisis given local and international circumstances and given the tie-in of the Lebanese issue with the Palestinian cause.

The Establishment And The Nationalist Movement

There is a relationship now only with one party, Prime Ministers al-Huss, and this is not enough; there must be a better relationship with President Sarkis.

The Nationalist Movement

There must be action in the form of a front as this is essential and there must be a formula for the nationalist movement and this formula must be improved.

The Lebanese Army

There is no national policy to base the army on. If the military establishment today does not have a clear national policy defined for it, this is a great danger. The national army means national entente and means a political solution. Today we have a national army with patriotic and non-patriotic elements operating and there is no room for absolute refusal or absolute acceptance.

The Progressive Socialist Party

Among the important issues we will be facing in this stage are the social and living standard crises.

The Lebanese South

The Arabs need to participate in providing the capability for a revival through useful social projects because the situation in the south and the tragedy which is unfolding there is difficult and needs massive energy.

The Syrian-Lebanese Relationship

Syrian-Lebanese relations have not so far been put on sound bases and there must be an Al-Asad-Sarkis summit to clarify things and overcome obstacles.

The Maronite Lebanese Front

If the Lebanese front actually wants entente then it needs to take another look at its stupid alliance with Israel which is useless and threatens the future of the balance with extinction.

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TUNISIA

MRS BOURGUIBA'S PROTEGES GET MINISTERIAL POSTS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 12 May 80 p 19

[Text] There is no question that never before, not even at the peaks of the numerous past crises, has the Tunisian regime appeared to be as close to its end. The tenuous thread by which it hangs is being unraveled every day. The latest changes that have occurred in the government and the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party], designed to provide a lease on life to Bourguibism and perhaps seek new scapegoats, will however be unable to brake the regime's deterioration. The Gafsa insurrection and the hanging of 13 Tunisian patriots have provoked muted anger in Tunisia: Two demonstrations protesting the executions of 17 April 1980 broke out within a few days of each other on the El-Menzah university campus and then spread to some thoroughfares in the capital. Seceral dozen students were arrested by the police.

A few weeks prior to the official resignation of Hedi Nouira [prime minister], the Tunisian head of state had proceeded in successive moves to some changes in the government and the Destourian Socialist Party. The partisans of the former prime minister were gradually shunted to the sidelines and they were given their "coup de grace" on 24 April 1980. All the ministers who had resigned on the eve of 26 January 1978 to indicate their disagreement with the policy followed vis-a-vis the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor] returned to the government in force: There was Mongi Kooli (who replaced Mohamed Sayah at the head of the PSD, an ouster which foreshadows perhaps the initiation of a dialog with the trade unions), Abdelaziz Lasrem, and Moncef Bel Hadj Amor. Their reinstatement was preceded by those of Tahar Belkhodja, appointed Tunisian ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, and Ahmed Bennour, in charge of the security police. Both of them has been ousted from the government a few weeks before the riots of 26 January 1978. And this ministerial reshuffling consecrates the sparkling revenge of Mrs Wassila Bourguiba, wife of the Tunisian president, against the Nouira clan and that of Mohamed Sayah. The latter, incidentally, saw one of his staunchest adversaries, Mongi Kooli, replace him as president of the Destourian Socialist Party.

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Trade Union Issue

All these changes stem from the warring of adversary clans which are sharpening their knives at the prospect of the Post-Habib Bourguiba era. As could be expected, no change in the basic options was announced. To be sure, Mohamed Mzali, who according to the Constitution would become Habib Bourguiba's successor, generally appears in the eyes of Tunisians as a "lesser evil" and benefits, it is true, from the sympathy and respect of broad social classes. It is stressed in Tunis, however, that to replace one prime minister with another without changing the political line responsible for the present impasse is hogwash and sham.

For the time being the essential problem which has not been solved yet is obviously that of the UGTT. It would be hasty to conclude, however, that the eclipse of those evidenced criminal intransigence in the face of the increase in struggles involving worker's demands in 1977 and 1978 is the prelude to a settlement of the trade union problem which would involve the release of all the jailed trade unionists and the preparation of a special UGTT congress as reported in the rumors making the rounds in Tunis. The coming months will tell whether Mohamed Mzali, who is endowed with good intentions, will break with the political style in effect so far or whether he will only be a simple executor of the president's decisions.

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